Hi all,
J. Bruce Fields wrote:
>> Changing /proc/sys/sunrpc/max_resvport to 1023 again resolves this
>> issue, however defeats the purpose for the initial problem. I still need
>> to look into the code for hte portmapper, but is it easily possible that
>> the portmapper would accept nfsd requests from "insecure" ports also?
>> Since e are (mostly) in a controlled environment that should not pose a
>> problem.
>>
>> Anyone with an idea?
>
> The immediate problem seems like a kernel bug to me--it seems to me that
> the calls to local daemons should be ignoring {min_,max}_resvport. (Or
> is there some way the daemons can still know that those calls come from
> the local kernel?)
I just found this in the Makefile for the portmapper:
# To disable tcp-wrapper style access control, comment out the following
# macro definitions. Access control can also be turned off by providing
# no access control tables. The local system, since it runs the portmap
# daemon, is always treated as an authorized host.
HOSTS_ACCESS= -DHOSTS_ACCESS
#WRAP_LIB = $(WRAP_DIR)/libwrap.a
WRAP_LIB = -lwrap
# Comment out if your RPC library does not allocate privileged ports for
# requests from processes with root privilege, or the new portmap will
# always reject requests to register/unregister services on privileged
# ports. You can find out by running "rpcinfo -p"; if all mountd and NIS
# daemons use a port >= 1024 you should probably disable the next line.
CHECK_PORT = -DCHECK_PORT
I'll try to head down the road of not checking for the ports anymore -
on exposed ports I could block the listening daemons from the outside
world by iptables. Not nice, but probably a solution (and yet another
custom package for us).
Anyone who knows a good reason not to walk this route?
Cheers
Carsten
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