On 29/09/20 15:39, Qian Cai wrote: > On Tue, 2020-09-29 at 14:26 +0200, Paolo Bonzini wrote: >> On 29/09/20 13:59, Qian Cai wrote: >>> WARN_ON_ONCE(!allow_smaller_maxphyaddr); >>> >>> I noticed the origin patch did not have this WARN_ON_ONCE(), but the >>> mainline >>> commit b96e6506c2ea ("KVM: x86: VMX: Make smaller physical guest address >>> space >>> support user-configurable") does have it for some reasons. >> >> Because that part of the code should not be reached. The exception >> bitmap is set up with >> >> if (!vmx_need_pf_intercept(vcpu)) >> eb &= ~(1u << PF_VECTOR); >> >> where >> >> static inline bool vmx_need_pf_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) >> { >> if (!enable_ept) >> return true; >> >> return allow_smaller_maxphyaddr && >> cpuid_maxphyaddr(vcpu) < boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits; >> } >> >> We shouldn't get here if "enable_ept && !allow_smaller_maxphyaddr", >> which implies vmx_need_pf_intercept(vcpu) == false. So the warning is >> genuine; I've sent a patch. > > Care to provide a link to the patch? Just curious. > Ok, I haven't sent it yet. :) But here it is: commit 608e2791d7353e7d777bf32038ca3e7d548155a4 (HEAD -> kvm-master) Author: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Tue Sep 29 08:31:32 2020 -0400 KVM: VMX: update PFEC_MASK/PFEC_MATCH together with PF intercept The PFEC_MASK and PFEC_MATCH fields in the VMCS reverse the meaning of the #PF intercept bit in the exception bitmap when they do not match. This means that, if PFEC_MASK and/or PFEC_MATCH are set, the hypervisor can get a vmexit for #PF exceptions even when the corresponding bit is clear in the exception bitmap. This is unexpected and is promptly reported as a WARN_ON_ONCE. To fix it, reset PFEC_MASK and PFEC_MATCH when the #PF intercept is disabled (as is common with enable_ept && !allow_smaller_maxphyaddr). Reported-by: Qian Cai <cai@xxxxxxxxxx>> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c index f0384e93548a..f4e9c310032a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -794,6 +794,18 @@ void update_exception_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) */ if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) eb |= get_vmcs12(vcpu)->exception_bitmap; + else { + /* + * If EPT is enabled, #PF is only trapped if MAXPHYADDR is mismatched + * between guest and host. In that case we only care about present + * faults. For vmcs02, however, PFEC_MASK and PFEC_MATCH are set in + * prepare_vmcs02_rare. + */ + bool selective_pf_trap = enable_ept && (eb & (1u << PF_VECTOR)); + int mask = selective_pf_trap ? PFERR_PRESENT_MASK : 0; + vmcs_write32(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MASK, mask); + vmcs_write32(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MATCH, mask); + } vmcs_write32(EXCEPTION_BITMAP, eb); } @@ -4355,16 +4367,6 @@ static void init_vmcs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) vmx->pt_desc.guest.output_mask = 0x7F; vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_RTIT_CTL, 0); } - - /* - * If EPT is enabled, #PF is only trapped if MAXPHYADDR is mismatched - * between guest and host. In that case we only care about present - * faults. - */ - if (enable_ept) { - vmcs_write32(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MASK, PFERR_PRESENT_MASK); - vmcs_write32(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MATCH, PFERR_PRESENT_MASK); - } } static void vmx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)