On 29/09/20 15:39, Qian Cai wrote:
> On Tue, 2020-09-29 at 14:26 +0200, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
>> On 29/09/20 13:59, Qian Cai wrote:
>>> WARN_ON_ONCE(!allow_smaller_maxphyaddr);
>>>
>>> I noticed the origin patch did not have this WARN_ON_ONCE(), but the
>>> mainline
>>> commit b96e6506c2ea ("KVM: x86: VMX: Make smaller physical guest address
>>> space
>>> support user-configurable") does have it for some reasons.
>>
>> Because that part of the code should not be reached. The exception
>> bitmap is set up with
>>
>> if (!vmx_need_pf_intercept(vcpu))
>> eb &= ~(1u << PF_VECTOR);
>>
>> where
>>
>> static inline bool vmx_need_pf_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>> {
>> if (!enable_ept)
>> return true;
>>
>> return allow_smaller_maxphyaddr &&
>> cpuid_maxphyaddr(vcpu) < boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits;
>> }
>>
>> We shouldn't get here if "enable_ept && !allow_smaller_maxphyaddr",
>> which implies vmx_need_pf_intercept(vcpu) == false. So the warning is
>> genuine; I've sent a patch.
>
> Care to provide a link to the patch? Just curious.
>
Ok, I haven't sent it yet. :) But here it is:
commit 608e2791d7353e7d777bf32038ca3e7d548155a4 (HEAD -> kvm-master)
Author: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Tue Sep 29 08:31:32 2020 -0400
KVM: VMX: update PFEC_MASK/PFEC_MATCH together with PF intercept
The PFEC_MASK and PFEC_MATCH fields in the VMCS reverse the meaning of
the #PF intercept bit in the exception bitmap when they do not match.
This means that, if PFEC_MASK and/or PFEC_MATCH are set, the
hypervisor can get a vmexit for #PF exceptions even when the
corresponding bit is clear in the exception bitmap.
This is unexpected and is promptly reported as a WARN_ON_ONCE.
To fix it, reset PFEC_MASK and PFEC_MATCH when the #PF intercept
is disabled (as is common with enable_ept && !allow_smaller_maxphyaddr).
Reported-by: Qian Cai <cai@xxxxxxxxxx>>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx>
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index f0384e93548a..f4e9c310032a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -794,6 +794,18 @@ void update_exception_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
*/
if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
eb |= get_vmcs12(vcpu)->exception_bitmap;
+ else {
+ /*
+ * If EPT is enabled, #PF is only trapped if MAXPHYADDR is mismatched
+ * between guest and host. In that case we only care about present
+ * faults. For vmcs02, however, PFEC_MASK and PFEC_MATCH are set in
+ * prepare_vmcs02_rare.
+ */
+ bool selective_pf_trap = enable_ept && (eb & (1u << PF_VECTOR));
+ int mask = selective_pf_trap ? PFERR_PRESENT_MASK : 0;
+ vmcs_write32(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MASK, mask);
+ vmcs_write32(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MATCH, mask);
+ }
vmcs_write32(EXCEPTION_BITMAP, eb);
}
@@ -4355,16 +4367,6 @@ static void init_vmcs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
vmx->pt_desc.guest.output_mask = 0x7F;
vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_RTIT_CTL, 0);
}
-
- /*
- * If EPT is enabled, #PF is only trapped if MAXPHYADDR is mismatched
- * between guest and host. In that case we only care about present
- * faults.
- */
- if (enable_ept) {
- vmcs_write32(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MASK, PFERR_PRESENT_MASK);
- vmcs_write32(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MATCH, PFERR_PRESENT_MASK);
- }
}
static void vmx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
