Hi - On Sat, Jan 23, 2010 at 07:04:01AM +0100, Ingo Molnar wrote: > [...] Also, if any systemtap person is interested in helping us > create a more generic filter engine out of the current ftrace filter > engine (which is really a precursor of a safe, sandboxed in-kernel > script engine), that would be excellent as well. [...] Thank you for the invitation. > More could be done - a simple C-like set of function perhaps - some minimal > per probe local variable state, etc. (perhaps even looping as well, with a > limit on number of predicament executions per filter invocation.) Yes, at some point when such bytecode intepreter gets rich enough, one may not need the translated-to-C means of running scripts. > ( _Such_ a facility, could then perhaps be used to allow applications access > to safe syscall sandboxing techniques: i.e. a programmable seccomp concept > in essence, controlled via ASCII space filter expressions [...] > IMHO that would be a superior concept for security modules too [...] > > [...] specific functionality with an immediately visible upside, > with no need for opaque hooks. This OTOH seem like rather a stretch. If one claims that "opaque hooks" are bad, so instead have hooks that jump not to auditable C code but an bytecode interpreter? And have the bytecodes be uploaded from userspace? How is this supposed to produce "transparency" from the kernel/hook point of view? - FChE -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-next" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
