Rationale for policy check procedure

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

 



Hi:

Could someone provide a rationale behind the algorithm in
__xfrm_policy_check? In particular, it seems that it is based
on the principle that the longer the security path, the more
trustworthy the package.  One application of this is that any
packet with a non-empty security path is allowed through if
there are no explicit policies forbidding it.

This principle looks OK at first glance.  However, I have
encountered some cases where it becomes a problem for the
IKE daemon.

I believe that this principle is broken when tunnel states are
present.  For example, imagine that you have a security gateway
connected directly to a trusted network.  On the same interface
an IPsec tunnel is established to a remote host that is less
trustworthy.

In the absence of the tunnel, the security gateway can afford
to accept packets with addresses from the trusted network.
However, with the presence of the tunnel, this is no longer
possible as packets can arrive inside the tunnel bearing an
address belonging to the trusted network.

Now perhaps that idea is that anyone creating a tunnel should
use firewall rules to protect themselves.  But it seems that for
that to work, we need to provide information about the security
path to the firewall subsystem.  Is that possible today?

It also seems to me that tunnel verification is more naturally
done inside the IPsec system as the information needed to do so
is already present, in the form of the incoming or forwarding
policy.  Optional security transforms though do pose a problem
to enforcing this.

To summarise, I'd like to find out the possible applications
of the principle I outlined earlier so as to justify the costs
that it imposes on the IKE daemon.  I'd also like to know the
intended purposes of optional transforms.

Cheers,
-- 
Debian GNU/Linux 3.0 is out! ( http://www.debian.org/ )
Email:  Herbert Xu ~{PmV>HI~} <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
-
: send the line "unsubscribe linux-net" in
the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

[Index of Archives]     [Netdev]     [Ethernet Bridging]     [Linux 802.1Q VLAN]     [Linux Wireless]     [Kernel Newbies]     [Security]     [Linux for Hams]     [Netfilter]     [Git]     [Bugtraq]     [Yosemite News and Information]     [MIPS Linux]     [ARM Linux]     [Linux RAID]     [Linux PCI]     [Linux Admin]     [Samba]

  Powered by Linux