Am Mittwoch, 4. Juli 2018, 14:41:22 CEST schrieb Sascha Hauer: > This patch adds the various helper functions needed for authentication > support. We need functions to hash nodes, to embed HMACs into a node and > to compare hashes and HMACs. Most functions first check if this > filesystem is authenticated and bail out early if not, which makes the > functions safe to be called with disabled authentication. > > Signed-off-by: Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> > --- > fs/ubifs/Kconfig | 1 + > fs/ubifs/Makefile | 1 + > fs/ubifs/auth.c | 413 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > fs/ubifs/ubifs.h | 187 +++++++++++++++++++++ > 4 files changed, 602 insertions(+) > create mode 100644 fs/ubifs/auth.c > > diff --git a/fs/ubifs/Kconfig b/fs/ubifs/Kconfig > index 83a961bf7280..2a0b5f1134a4 100644 > --- a/fs/ubifs/Kconfig > +++ b/fs/ubifs/Kconfig > @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ config UBIFS_FS > select CRYPTO if UBIFS_FS_ZLIB > select CRYPTO_LZO if UBIFS_FS_LZO > select CRYPTO_DEFLATE if UBIFS_FS_ZLIB > + select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO > depends on MTD_UBI > help > UBIFS is a file system for flash devices which works on top of UBI. > diff --git a/fs/ubifs/Makefile b/fs/ubifs/Makefile > index 9758f709c736..2bdb8ae2f435 100644 > --- a/fs/ubifs/Makefile > +++ b/fs/ubifs/Makefile > @@ -7,3 +7,4 @@ ubifs-y += budget.o find.o tnc_commit.o compress.o lpt.o lprops.o > ubifs-y += recovery.o ioctl.o lpt_commit.o tnc_misc.o xattr.o debug.o > ubifs-y += misc.o > ubifs-$(CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_ENCRYPTION) += crypto.o > +ubifs-$(CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_AUTHENTICATION) += auth.o > diff --git a/fs/ubifs/auth.c b/fs/ubifs/auth.c > new file mode 100644 > index 000000000000..fd21f2ec8734 > --- /dev/null > +++ b/fs/ubifs/auth.c > @@ -0,0 +1,413 @@ > +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 > +/* > + * This file is part of UBIFS. > + * > + * Copyright (C) 2018 Pengutronix, Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> > + */ > + > +/* > + * This file implements various helper functions for UBIFS authentication support > + */ > + > +#include <linux/crypto.h> > +#include <crypto/hash.h> > +#include <crypto/sha.h> > +#include <crypto/algapi.h> > +#include <keys/user-type.h> > + > +#include "ubifs.h" > + > +/** > + * ubifs_node_calc_hash - calculate the hash of a UBIFS node > + * @c: UBIFS file-system description object > + * @node: the node to calculate a hash for > + * @hash: the returned hash > + */ > +void __ubifs_node_calc_hash(const struct ubifs_info *c, const void *node, > + u8 *hash) > +{ > + const struct ubifs_ch *ch = node; > + SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(shash, c->hash_tfm); > + > + shash->tfm = c->hash_tfm; > + shash->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP; > + > + crypto_shash_digest(shash, node, le32_to_cpu(ch->len), hash); > +} > + > +/** > + * ubifs_hash_calc_hmac - calculate a HMAC from a hash > + * @c: UBIFS file-system description object > + * @hash: the node to calculate a HMAC for > + * @hmac: the returned HMAC > + */ > +static void ubifs_hash_calc_hmac(const struct ubifs_info *c, const u8 *hash, > + u8 *hmac) > +{ > + SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(shash, c->hmac_tfm); > + > + shash->tfm = c->hmac_tfm; > + shash->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP; > + > + crypto_shash_digest(shash, hash, c->hash_len, hmac); Crypto functions can fail, you need to check the return value. (Please check also other call sites) > +} > + > +/** > + * ubifs_prepare_auth_node - Prepare an authentication node > + * @c: UBIFS file-system description object > + * @node: the node to calculate a hash for > + * @hash: input hash of previous nodes > + * > + * This function prepares an authentication node for writing onto flash. > + * It creates a HMAC from the given input hash and writes it to the node. > + */ > +void ubifs_prepare_auth_node(struct ubifs_info *c, void *node, > + struct shash_desc *inhash) > +{ > + SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(hash_desc, c->hash_tfm); > + struct ubifs_auth_node *auth = node; > + u8 hash[crypto_shash_descsize(c->hash_tfm)]; Doesn't this introduce a new VLA? Not that me make Kees unhappy. ;-) > + hash_desc->tfm = c->hash_tfm; > + hash_desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP; > + ubifs_shash_copy_state(c, inhash, hash_desc); > + crypto_shash_final(hash_desc, hash); > + > + ubifs_hash_calc_hmac(c, hash, auth->hmac); > + > + auth->ch.node_type = UBIFS_AUTH_NODE; > + ubifs_prepare_node(c, auth, ubifs_auth_node_sz(c), 0); > +} > + > +static struct shash_desc *ubifs_get_desc(const struct ubifs_info *c, > + struct crypto_shash *tfm) > +{ > + struct shash_desc *desc; > + int err; > + > + if (!ubifs_authenticated(c)) > + return NULL; > + > + desc = kmalloc(sizeof(*desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(tfm), GFP_KERNEL); > + if (!desc) > + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); > + > + desc->tfm = tfm; > + desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP; > + > + err = crypto_shash_init(desc); > + if (err) { > + kfree(desc); > + return ERR_PTR(err); > + } > + > + return desc; > +} > + > +/** > + * __ubifs_hash_get_desc - get a descriptor suitable for hashing a node > + * @c: UBIFS file-system description object > + * > + * This function returns a descriptor suitable for hashing a node. Free after use > + * with kfree. > + */ > +struct shash_desc *__ubifs_hash_get_desc(const struct ubifs_info *c) > +{ > + return ubifs_get_desc(c, c->hash_tfm); > +} > + > +/** > + * __ubifs_shash_final - finalize shash > + * @c: UBIFS file-system description object > + * @desc: the descriptor > + * @out: the output hash > + * > + * Simple wrapper around crypto_shash_final(), safe to be called with > + * disabled authentication. > + */ > +int __ubifs_shash_final(const struct ubifs_info *c, struct shash_desc *desc, > + u8 *out) > +{ > + if (ubifs_authenticated(c)) > + return crypto_shash_final(desc, out); > + > + return 0; > +} > + > +/** > + * __ubifs_node_check_hash - check the hash of a node against given hash > + * @c: UBIFS file-system description object > + * @node: the node > + * @expected: the expected hash > + * > + * This function calculates a hash over a node and compares it to the given hash. > + * Returns 0 if both hashes are equal or authentication is disabled, otherwise a > + * negative error code is returned. > + */ > +int __ubifs_node_check_hash(const struct ubifs_info *c, void *node, > + const u8 *expected) > +{ > + u8 calc[UBIFS_MAX_HASH_LEN]; > + > + __ubifs_node_calc_hash(c, node, calc); > + > + if (ubifs_check_hash(c, expected, calc)) > + return -EPERM; Not sure if this action isn't a little too weak. If a node's hash is not valid we are already in deep trouble and I'm not sure whether it makes sense to trust the filesystem at all anymore. But that's in general something I need to sort out with VFS/fscrypt folks. > + return 0; > +} > + > +/** > + * ubifs_init_authentication - initialize UBIFS authentication support > + * @c: UBIFS file-system description object > + * > + * This function returns 0 for success or a negative error code otherwise. > + */ > +int ubifs_init_authentication(struct ubifs_info *c) > +{ > + struct key *keyring_key; > + const struct user_key_payload *ukp; > + int err; > + char hmac_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME]; > + > + if (!c->auth_hash_name) { > + ubifs_err(c, "authentication hash name needed with authentication"); > + return -EINVAL; > + } > + > + c->auth_hash_algo = match_string(hash_algo_name, HASH_ALGO__LAST, > + c->auth_hash_name); > + if ((int)c->auth_hash_algo < 0) { > + ubifs_err(c, "Unknown hash algo %s specified", > + c->auth_hash_name); > + return -EINVAL; > + } > + > + snprintf(hmac_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "hmac(%s)", > + c->auth_hash_name); > + > + keyring_key = request_key(&key_type_logon, c->auth_key_name, NULL); > + > + if (IS_ERR(keyring_key)) { > + ubifs_err(c, "Failed to request key: %ld", > + PTR_ERR(keyring_key)); > + return PTR_ERR(keyring_key); > + } > + > + down_read(&keyring_key->sem); > + > + if (keyring_key->type != &key_type_logon) { > + ubifs_err(c, "key type must be logon"); > + err = -ENOKEY; > + goto out; > + } > + > + ukp = user_key_payload_locked(keyring_key); > + if (!ukp) { > + /* key was revoked before we acquired its semaphore */ > + err = -EKEYREVOKED; > + goto out; > + } > + > + c->hash_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(c->auth_hash_name, 0, > + CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); > + if (IS_ERR(c->hash_tfm)) { > + err = PTR_ERR(c->hash_tfm); > + ubifs_err(c, "Can not allocate %s: %d", > + c->auth_hash_name, err); > + goto out; > + } > + > + c->hash_len = crypto_shash_digestsize(c->hash_tfm); > + if (c->hash_len > UBIFS_MAX_HASH_LEN) { > + ubifs_err(c, "hash %s is bigger than maximum allowed hash size (%d > %d)", > + c->auth_hash_name, c->hash_len, UBIFS_MAX_HASH_LEN); > + err = -EINVAL; > + goto out_free_hash; > + } > + > + c->hmac_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hmac_name, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); > + if (IS_ERR(c->hmac_tfm)) { > + err = PTR_ERR(c->hmac_tfm); > + ubifs_err(c, "Can not allocate %s: %d", hmac_name, err); > + goto out_free_hash; > + } > + > + c->hmac_desc_len = crypto_shash_digestsize(c->hmac_tfm); > + if (c->hmac_desc_len > UBIFS_MAX_HMAC_LEN) { > + ubifs_err(c, "hmac %s is bigger than maximum allowed hmac size (%d > %d)", > + hmac_name, c->hmac_desc_len, UBIFS_MAX_HMAC_LEN); > + err = -EINVAL; > + goto out_free_hash; > + } > + > + err = crypto_shash_setkey(c->hmac_tfm, ukp->data, ukp->datalen); > + if (err) > + goto out_free_hmac; > + > + c->authenticated = true; > + > + c->log_hash = ubifs_hash_get_desc(c); > + if (IS_ERR(c->log_hash)) > + goto out_free_hmac; > + > + err = 0; > + > +out_free_hmac: > + if (err) > + crypto_free_shash(c->hmac_tfm); > +out_free_hash: > + if (err) > + crypto_free_shash(c->hash_tfm); > +out: > + up_read(&keyring_key->sem); > + key_put(keyring_key); > + > + return err; > +} > + > +/** > + * __ubifs_exit_authentication - release resource > + * @c: UBIFS file-system description object > + * > + * This function releases the authentication related resources. > + */ > +void __ubifs_exit_authentication(struct ubifs_info *c) > +{ > + if (!ubifs_authenticated(c)) > + return; > + > + crypto_free_shash(c->hmac_tfm); > + crypto_free_shash(c->hash_tfm); > + kfree(c->log_hash); > +} > + > +/** > + * ubifs_node_calc_hmac - calculate the HMAC of a UBIFS node > + * @c: UBIFS file-system description object > + * @node: the node to insert a HMAC into. > + * @len: the length of the node > + * @ofs_hmac: the offset in the node where the HMAC is inserted > + * @hmac: returned HMAC > + * > + * This function calculates a HMAC of a UBIFS node. The HMAC is expected to be > + * embedded into the node, so this area is not covered by the HMAC. Also not > + * covered is the UBIFS_NODE_MAGIC and the CRC of the node. > + */ > +static void ubifs_node_calc_hmac(const struct ubifs_info *c, const void *node, > + int len, int ofs_hmac, void *hmac) > +{ > + SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(shash, c->hmac_tfm); > + int hmac_len = c->hmac_desc_len; > + > + ubifs_assert(ofs_hmac > 8); > + ubifs_assert(ofs_hmac + hmac_len < len); > + > + shash->tfm = c->hmac_tfm; > + shash->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP; > + > + crypto_shash_init(shash); > + > + /* behind common node header CRC up to HMAC begin */ > + crypto_shash_update(shash, node + 8, ofs_hmac - 8); > + > + /* behind HMAC, if any */ > + if (len - ofs_hmac - hmac_len > 0) > + crypto_shash_update(shash, node + ofs_hmac + hmac_len, > + len - ofs_hmac - hmac_len); > + > + crypto_shash_final(shash, hmac); > +} > + > +/** > + * __ubifs_node_insert_hmac - insert a HMAC into a UBIFS node > + * @c: UBIFS file-system description object > + * @node: the node to insert a HMAC into. > + * @len: the length of the node > + * @ofs_hmac: the offset in the node where the HMAC is inserted > + * > + * This function inserts a HMAC at offset @ofs_hmac into the node given in > + * @node. > + */ > +void __ubifs_node_insert_hmac(const struct ubifs_info *c, void *node, int len, > + int ofs_hmac) > +{ > + ubifs_node_calc_hmac(c, node, len, ofs_hmac, node + ofs_hmac); > +} > + > +/** > + * __ubifs_node_verify_hmac - verify the HMAC of UBIFS node > + * @c: UBIFS file-system description object > + * @node: the node to insert a HMAC into. > + * @len: the length of the node > + * @ofs_hmac: the offset in the node where the HMAC is inserted > + * > + * This function verifies the HMAC at offset @ofs_hmac of the node given in > + * @node. Returns 0 if successful or a negative error code otherwise. > + */ > +int __ubifs_node_verify_hmac(const struct ubifs_info *c, const void *node, > + int len, int ofs_hmac) > +{ > + int hmac_len = c->hmac_desc_len; > + u8 *hmac; > + int err; > + > + hmac = kmalloc(hmac_len, GFP_NOFS); > + if (!hmac) > + return -ENOMEM; > + > + ubifs_node_calc_hmac(c, node, len, ofs_hmac, hmac); > + > + err = crypto_memneq(hmac, node + ofs_hmac, hmac_len); > + > + kfree(hmac); > + > + if (!err) > + return 0; > + > + return -EPERM; Same. > +} > + > +int __ubifs_shash_copy_state(const struct ubifs_info *c, struct shash_desc *src, > + struct shash_desc *target) > +{ > + u8 state[crypto_shash_descsize(src->tfm)]; > + int err; > + > + err = crypto_shash_export(src, state); > + if (err) > + return err; > + > + return crypto_shash_import(target, state); > +} > + > +/** > + * ubifs_hmac_wkm - Create a HMAC of the well known message > + * @c: UBIFS file-system description object > + * @hmac: The HMAC of the well known message > + * > + * This function creates a HMAC of a well known message. This is used > + * to check if the provided key is suitable to authenticate a UBIFS > + * image. This is only a convenience to the user to provide a better > + * error message when the wrong key is provided. > + */ > +void ubifs_hmac_wkm(struct ubifs_info *c, u8 *hmac) > +{ > + SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(shash, c->hmac_tfm); > + int err; > + const char well_known_message[] = "UBIFS"; > + > + if (!ubifs_authenticated(c)) > + return; > + > + shash->tfm = c->hmac_tfm; > + shash->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP; > + > + err = crypto_shash_init(shash); > + BUG_ON(err); Huh? Do we really have to shoot the kernel in the head here? Thanks, //richard ______________________________________________________ Linux MTD discussion mailing list http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-mtd/