The code was taking the semaphore for reading, which does not protect against readers nor concurrent modifications. The problem could cause a sanity checks to fail in procfs's cmdline reader, resulting in an OOPS. Note that some functions perform an unlocked read of various mm fields, but they seem to be fine despite possible modificaton. Signed-off-by: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@xxxxxxxxxx> --- kernel/sys.c | 20 ++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c index 6af9212..78947de 100644 --- a/kernel/sys.c +++ b/kernel/sys.c @@ -1853,11 +1853,13 @@ static int prctl_set_mm_map(int opt, const void __user *addr, unsigned long data user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE - 1] = AT_NULL; } - if (prctl_map.exe_fd != (u32)-1) + if (prctl_map.exe_fd != (u32)-1) { error = prctl_set_mm_exe_file(mm, prctl_map.exe_fd); - down_read(&mm->mmap_sem); - if (error) - goto out; + if (error) + return error; + } + + down_write(&mm->mmap_sem); /* * We don't validate if these members are pointing to @@ -1894,10 +1896,8 @@ static int prctl_set_mm_map(int opt, const void __user *addr, unsigned long data if (prctl_map.auxv_size) memcpy(mm->saved_auxv, user_auxv, sizeof(user_auxv)); - error = 0; -out: - up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); - return error; + up_write(&mm->mmap_sem); + return 0; } #endif /* CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE */ @@ -1963,7 +1963,7 @@ static int prctl_set_mm(int opt, unsigned long addr, error = -EINVAL; - down_read(&mm->mmap_sem); + down_write(&mm->mmap_sem); vma = find_vma(mm, addr); prctl_map.start_code = mm->start_code; @@ -2056,7 +2056,7 @@ static int prctl_set_mm(int opt, unsigned long addr, error = 0; out: - up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); + up_write(&mm->mmap_sem); return error; } -- 1.8.3.1 -- To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to majordomo@xxxxxxxxx. For more info on Linux MM, see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ . Don't email: <a href=mailto:"dont@xxxxxxxxx"> email@xxxxxxxxx </a>