On Wed, 18 Nov 2015 15:20:05 -0800 Daniel Cashman <dcashman@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> --- a/kernel/sysctl.c
> +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
> @@ -1568,6 +1568,28 @@ static struct ctl_table vm_table[] = {
> .mode = 0644,
> .proc_handler = proc_doulongvec_minmax,
> },
> +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS
> + {
> + .procname = "mmap_rnd_bits",
> + .data = &mmap_rnd_bits,
> + .maxlen = sizeof(mmap_rnd_bits),
> + .mode = 0644,
Is there any harm in permitting the attacker to read these values?
And is there any benefit in permitting non-attackers to read them?
> + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
> + .extra1 = &mmap_rnd_bits_min,
> + .extra2 = &mmap_rnd_bits_max,
> + },
> +#endif
> +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS
> + {
> + .procname = "mmap_rnd_compat_bits",
> + .data = &mmap_rnd_compat_bits,
> + .maxlen = sizeof(mmap_rnd_compat_bits),
> + .mode = 0644,
> + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
> + .extra1 = &mmap_rnd_compat_bits_min,
> + .extra2 = &mmap_rnd_compat_bits_max,
> + },
> +#endif
>
> ...
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS
> +int mmap_rnd_bits_min = CONFIG_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MIN;
> +int mmap_rnd_bits_max = CONFIG_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MAX;
> +int mmap_rnd_bits = CONFIG_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS;
> +#endif
> +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS
> +int mmap_rnd_compat_bits_min = CONFIG_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MIN;
> +int mmap_rnd_compat_bits_max = CONFIG_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MAX;
> +int mmap_rnd_compat_bits = CONFIG_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS;
These could be __read_mostly.
If one believes in such things. One effect of __read_mostly is to
clump the write-often stuff into the same cachelines and I've never
been convinced that one outweighs the other...
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