Dmitry Vyukov wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 8:30 PM, Kirill A. Shutemov
> <kirill@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > On Mon, Oct 12, 2015 at 08:18:21PM -0700, Davidlohr Bueso wrote:
> >> On Mon, 12 Oct 2015, Bueso wrote:
> >>
> >> >On Mon, 12 Oct 2015, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> >> >
> >> >>On Mon, Oct 12, 2015 at 10:49:45AM -0700, Davidlohr Bueso wrote:
> >> >>>diff --git a/ipc/shm.c b/ipc/shm.c
> >> >>>index 4178727..9615f19 100644
> >> >>>--- a/ipc/shm.c
> >> >>>+++ b/ipc/shm.c
> >> >>>@@ -385,9 +385,25 @@ static struct mempolicy *shm_get_policy(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
> >> >>>static int shm_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
> >> >>>{
> >> >>>- struct shm_file_data *sfd = shm_file_data(file);
> >> >>>+ struct file *vma_file = vma->vm_file;
> >> >>>+ struct shm_file_data *sfd = shm_file_data(vma_file);
> >> >>>+ struct ipc_ids *ids = &shm_ids(sfd->ns);
> >> >>>+ struct kern_ipc_perm *shp;
> >> >>> int ret;
> >> >>>+ rcu_read_lock();
> >> >>>+ shp = ipc_obtain_object_check(ids, sfd->id);
> >> >>>+ if (IS_ERR(shp)) {
> >> >>>+ ret = -EINVAL;
> >> >>>+ goto err;
> >> >>>+ }
> >> >>>+
> >> >>>+ if (!ipc_valid_object(shp)) {
> >> >>>+ ret = -EIDRM;
> >> >>>+ goto err;
> >> >>>+ }
> >> >>>+ rcu_read_unlock();
> >> >>>+
> >> >>
> >> >>Hm. Isn't it racy? What prevents IPC_RMID from happening after this point?
> >> >
> >> >Nothing, but that is later caught by shm_open() doing similar checks. We
> >> >basically end up doing a check between ->mmap() calls, which is fair imho.
> >> >Note that this can occur anywhere in ipc as IPC_RMID is a user request/cmd,
> >> >and we try to respect it -- thus you can argue this race anywhere, which is
> >> >why we have EIDRM/EINVL. Ultimately the user should not be doing such hacks
> >> >_anyway_. So I'm not really concerned about it.
> >> >
> >> >Another similar alternative would be perhaps to make shm_lock() return an
> >> >error, and thus propagate that error to mmap return. That way we would have
> >> >a silent way out of the warning scenario (afterward we cannot race as we
> >> >hold the ipc object lock). However, the users would now have to take this
> >> >into account...
> >> >
> >> > [validity check lockless]
> >> > ->mmap()
> >> > [validity check lock]
> >>
> >> Something like this, maybe. Although I could easily be missing things...
> >> I've tested it enough to see Dimitry's testcase handled ok, and put it
> >> through ltp. Also adding Manfred to the Cc, who always catches my idiotic
> >> mistakes.
> >>
> >> 8<---------------------------------------------------------------------
> >> From: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> >> Date: Mon, 12 Oct 2015 19:38:34 -0700
> >> Subject: [PATCH] ipc/shm: fix handling of (re)attaching to a deleted segment
> >>
> >> There are currently two issues when dealing with segments that are
> >> marked for deletion:
> >>
> >> (i) With d0edd8528362 (ipc: convert invalid scenarios to use WARN_ON)
> >> we relaxed the system-wide impact of using a deleted segment. However,
> >> we can now perfectly well trigger the warning and then deference a nil
> >> pointer -- where shp does not exist.
> >>
> >> (ii) As of a399b29dfbaa (ipc,shm: fix shm_file deletion races) we
> >> forbid attaching/mapping a previously deleted segment; a feature once
> >> unique to Linux, but removed[1] as a side effect of lockless ipc object
> >> lookups and security checks. Similarly, Dmitry Vyukov reported[2] a
> >> simple test case that creates a new vma for a previously deleted
> >> segment, triggering the WARN_ON mentioned in (i).
> >>
> >> This patch tries to address (i) by moving the shp error check out
> >> of shm_lock() and handled by the caller instead. The benefit of this
> >> is that it allows better handling out of situations where we end up
> >> returning ERMID or EINVAL. Specifically, there are three callers
> >> of shm_lock which we must look into:
> >>
> >> - open/close -- which we ensure to never do any operations on
> >> the pairs, thus becoming no-ops if found a prev
> >> IPC_RMID.
> >>
> >> - loosing the reference of nattch upon shmat(2) -- not feasible.
> >>
> >> In addition, the common WARN_ON call is technically removed, but
> >> we add a new one for the bogus shmat(2) case, which is definitely
> >> unacceptable to race with RMID if nattch is bumped up.
> >>
> >> To address (ii), a new shm_check_vma_validity() helper is added
> >> (for lack of a better name), which attempts to detect early on
> >> any races with RMID, before doing the full ->mmap. There is still
> >> a window between the callback and the shm_open call where we can
> >> race with IPC_RMID. If this is the case, it is handled by the next
> >> shm_lock().
> >>
> >> shm_mmap:
> >> [shm validity checks lockless]
> >> ->mmap()
> >> [shm validity checks lock] <-- at this point there after there
> >> is no race as we hold the ipc
> >> object lock.
> >>
> >> [1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/10/12/483
> >> [2] https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/10/12/284
> >>
> >> Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@xxxxxxx>
> >> ---
> >> ipc/shm.c | 78 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
> >> 1 file changed, 73 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
> >>
> >> diff --git a/ipc/shm.c b/ipc/shm.c
> >> index 4178727..47a7a67 100644
> >> --- a/ipc/shm.c
> >> +++ b/ipc/shm.c
> >> @@ -156,11 +156,10 @@ static inline struct shmid_kernel *shm_lock(struct ipc_namespace *ns, int id)
> >> struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp = ipc_lock(&shm_ids(ns), id);
> >> /*
> >> - * We raced in the idr lookup or with shm_destroy(). Either way, the
> >> - * ID is busted.
> >> + * Callers of shm_lock() must validate the status of the returned
> >> + * ipc object pointer (as returned by ipc_lock()), and error out as
> >> + * appropriate.
> >> */
> >> - WARN_ON(IS_ERR(ipcp));
> >> -
> >> return container_of(ipcp, struct shmid_kernel, shm_perm);
> >> }
> >> @@ -194,6 +193,15 @@ static void shm_open(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
> >> struct shmid_kernel *shp;
> >> shp = shm_lock(sfd->ns, sfd->id);
> >> + /*
> >> + * We raced in the idr lookup or with shm_destroy().
> >> + * Either way, the ID is busted. In the same scenario,
> >> + * but for the close counter-part, the nattch counter
> >> + * is never decreased, thus we can safely return.
> >> + */
> >> + if (IS_ERR(shp))
> >> + return; /* no-op */
> >> +
> >> shp->shm_atim = get_seconds();
> >> shp->shm_lprid = task_tgid_vnr(current);
> >> shp->shm_nattch++;
> >
> > ...
> >
> >> static int shm_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
> >> {
> >> struct shm_file_data *sfd = shm_file_data(file);
> >> int ret;
> >> + /*
> >> + * Ensure that we have not raced with IPC_RMID, such that
> >> + * we avoid doing the ->mmap altogether. This is a preventive
> >> + * lockless check, and thus exposed to races during the mmap.
> >> + * However, this is later caught in shm_open(), and handled
> >> + * accordingly.
> >> + */
> >> + ret = shm_check_vma_validity(vma);
> >> + if (ret)
> >> + return ret;
> >> +
> >> ret = sfd->file->f_op->mmap(sfd->file, vma);
> >> if (ret != 0)
> >> return ret;
> >> +
> >> sfd->vm_ops = vma->vm_ops;
> >> #ifdef CONFIG_MMU
> >> WARN_ON(!sfd->vm_ops->fault);
> >
> > If I read it correctly, with the patch we would ignore locking failure
> > inside shm_open() and mmap will succeed in this case. So the idea is to
> > have shm_close() no-op and therefore symmetrical. That's look fragile to
> > me. We would silently miss some other broken open/close pattern.
> >
> > I would rather propagate error to shm_mmap() caller and therefore to
> > userspace. I guess it's better to opencode shm_open() in shm_mmap() and
> > return error this way. shm_open() itself can have WARN_ON_ONCE() for
> > failure or something.
>
>
> Davidlohr, any updates on this? Is it committed? I don't see it in Linus tree.
> What do you think about Kirill's comments?
What about this:
>From 06b0fc9d62592f6f3ad9f45cccf1f6a5b3113bdc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Thu, 5 Nov 2015 15:53:04 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] ipc/shm: handle removed segments gracefully in shm_mmap()
remap_file_pages(2) emulation can reach file which represents removed
IPC ID as long as a memory segment is mapped. It breaks expectations
of IPC subsystem.
Test case (rewritten to be more human readable, originally autogenerated
by syzkaller[1]):
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/ipc.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/shm.h>
#define PAGE_SIZE 4096
int main()
{
int id;
void *p;
id = shmget(IPC_PRIVATE, 3 * PAGE_SIZE, 0);
p = shmat(id, NULL, 0);
shmctl(id, IPC_RMID, NULL);
remap_file_pages(p, 3 * PAGE_SIZE, 0, 7, 0);
return 0;
}
The patch changes shm_mmap() and code around shm_lock() to propagate
locking error back to caller of shm_mmap().
[1] http://github.com/google/syzkaller
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
ipc/shm.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
1 file changed, 43 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/ipc/shm.c b/ipc/shm.c
index 41787276e141..3174634ca4e5 100644
--- a/ipc/shm.c
+++ b/ipc/shm.c
@@ -156,11 +156,12 @@ static inline struct shmid_kernel *shm_lock(struct ipc_namespace *ns, int id)
struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp = ipc_lock(&shm_ids(ns), id);
/*
- * We raced in the idr lookup or with shm_destroy(). Either way, the
- * ID is busted.
+ * Callers of shm_lock() must validate the status of the returned ipc
+ * object pointer (as returned by ipc_lock()), and error out as
+ * appropriate.
*/
- WARN_ON(IS_ERR(ipcp));
-
+ if (IS_ERR(ipcp))
+ return (void *)ipcp;
return container_of(ipcp, struct shmid_kernel, shm_perm);
}
@@ -186,18 +187,33 @@ static inline void shm_rmid(struct ipc_namespace *ns, struct shmid_kernel *s)
}
-/* This is called by fork, once for every shm attach. */
-static void shm_open(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+static int __shm_open(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
struct file *file = vma->vm_file;
struct shm_file_data *sfd = shm_file_data(file);
struct shmid_kernel *shp;
shp = shm_lock(sfd->ns, sfd->id);
+
+ if (IS_ERR(shp))
+ return PTR_ERR(shp);
+
shp->shm_atim = get_seconds();
shp->shm_lprid = task_tgid_vnr(current);
shp->shm_nattch++;
shm_unlock(shp);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* This is called by fork, once for every shm attach. */
+static void shm_open(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+ int err = __shm_open(vma);
+ /*
+ * We raced in the idr lookup or with shm_destroy().
+ * Either way, the ID is busted.
+ */
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(err);
}
/*
@@ -260,6 +276,14 @@ static void shm_close(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
down_write(&shm_ids(ns).rwsem);
/* remove from the list of attaches of the shm segment */
shp = shm_lock(ns, sfd->id);
+
+ /*
+ * We raced in the idr lookup or with shm_destroy().
+ * Either way, the ID is busted.
+ */
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(IS_ERR(shp)))
+ goto done; /* no-op */
+
shp->shm_lprid = task_tgid_vnr(current);
shp->shm_dtim = get_seconds();
shp->shm_nattch--;
@@ -267,6 +291,7 @@ static void shm_close(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
shm_destroy(ns, shp);
else
shm_unlock(shp);
+done:
up_write(&shm_ids(ns).rwsem);
}
@@ -388,17 +413,25 @@ static int shm_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
struct shm_file_data *sfd = shm_file_data(file);
int ret;
+ /*
+ * In case of remap_file_pages() emulation, the file can represent
+ * removed IPC ID: propogate shm_lock() error to caller.
+ */
+ ret =__shm_open(vma);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
ret = sfd->file->f_op->mmap(sfd->file, vma);
- if (ret != 0)
+ if (ret) {
+ shm_close(vma);
return ret;
+ }
sfd->vm_ops = vma->vm_ops;
#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
WARN_ON(!sfd->vm_ops->fault);
#endif
vma->vm_ops = &shm_vm_ops;
- shm_open(vma);
-
- return ret;
+ return 0;
}
static int shm_release(struct inode *ino, struct file *file)
--
2.6.1
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