MM reviewers, if you are going to look at one thing, please look at patch 14 which adds a bunch of additional vma/pte permission checks. Everybody else, please take a look at the two syscall alternatives, especially the non-x86 folk. This is a second big, fat RFC. This code is not runnable to anyone outside of Intel unless they have some special hardware or a fancy simulator. If you are interested in running this for real, please get in touch with me. Hardware is available to a very small but nonzero number of people. Since the last posting, I have implemented almost all of the "software enforcement" for protection keys. Basically, in places where we look at VMA or PTE permissions, we try to enforce protection keys to make it act similarly to mprotect(). This is the part of the approach that really needs the most review and is almost entirely contained in the "check VMAs and PTEs for protection keys". I also implemented a new system call. There are basically two possibilities for plumbing protection keys out to userspace. I've included *both* approaches here: 1. Create a new system call: mprotect_key(). It's mprotect(), plus a protection key. The patches implementing this have [NEWSYSCALL] in the subject. 2. Hijack some space in the PROT_* bits and pass a protection key in there. That way, existing system calls like mmap(), mprotect(), etc... just work. The patches implementing this have [HIJACKPROT] in the subject and must be applied without the [NEWSYSCALL] ones. There is still work left to do here. Current TODO: * Build on something other than x86 * Do some more exhaustive x86 randconfig tests * Make sure DAX mappings work * Pound on some of the modified paths to ensure limited performance impact from modifications to hot paths. This set is also available here (with the new syscall): git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/daveh/x86-pkeys.git pkeys-v005 A version with the modification of the PROT_ syscalls is tagged as 'pkeys-v005-protsyscalls'. === diffstat (new syscall version) === Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 3 Documentation/x86/protection-keys.txt | 65 ++++++++++++++++++++ arch/powerpc/include/asm/mman.h | 5 - arch/x86/Kconfig | 15 ++++ arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1 arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 54 ++++++++++------ arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 12 +++ arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h | 17 +++++ arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h | 4 - arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 37 +++++++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h | 34 +++++++++- arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h | 4 + arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h | 33 ++++++++++ arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h | 23 +++++++ arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h | 2 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 27 ++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c | 10 ++- arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 2 arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 9 ++ arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 89 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- arch/x86/mm/gup.c | 37 ++++++----- drivers/char/agp/frontend.c | 2 drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c | 3 fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 5 + include/asm-generic/mm_hooks.h | 12 +++ include/linux/mm.h | 15 ++++ include/linux/mman.h | 6 - include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h | 11 +++ mm/Kconfig | 11 +++ mm/gup.c | 28 +++++++- mm/memory.c | 8 +- mm/mmap.c | 2 mm/mprotect.c | 20 +++++- 35 files changed, 607 insertions(+), 66 deletions(-) == FEATURE OVERVIEW == Memory Protection Keys for Userspace (PKU aka PKEYs) is a CPU feature which will be found in future Intel CPUs. The work here was done with the aid of simulators. Memory Protection Keys provides a mechanism for enforcing page-based protections, but without requiring modification of the page tables when an application changes protection domains. It works by dedicating 4 previously ignored bits in each page table entry to assigning a "protection key", giving 16 possible keys to each page mapping. There is also a new user-accessible register (PKRU) with two separate bits (Access Disable and Write Disable) for each key. Being a CPU register, PKRU is inherently thread-local, potentially giving each thread a different set of protections from every other thread. There are two new instructions (RDPKRU/WRPKRU) for reading and writing to the new register. The feature is only available in 64-bit mode, even though there is theoretically space in the PAE PTEs. These permissions are enforced on data access only and have no effect on instruction fetches. -- To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to majordomo@xxxxxxxxx. For more info on Linux MM, see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ . Don't email: <a href=mailto:"dont@xxxxxxxxx";> email@xxxxxxxxx </a>