Re: [PATCH] Hardening memory maunipulation.

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On 04/29/2015 08:39 AM, Shawn Chang wrote:
From: Shawn C <citypw@xxxxxxxxx>

Hi kernel maintainers,

It won't allow the address above the TASK_SIZE being mmap'ed( or mprotect'ed).
This patch is from PaX/Grsecurity.

Thanks for your review time!

Does this actually reduce the attack surface of anything?

These functions all search for vmas. If there's a vma outside of the user range, we have a problem.

Also, that use of TASK_SIZE is IMO ridiculous.  Shouldn't be TASK_SIZE_MAX?

--Andy, who is annoyed every time another pointless TIF_IA32 reference, even hidden in a macro, makes it into the kernel

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