On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 5:17 AM, Jiri Kosina <jkosina@xxxxxxx> wrote:
> Commit e2b32e678 ("x86, kaslr: randomize module base load address") makes
> the base address for module to be unconditionally randomized in case when
> CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE is defined and "nokaslr" option isn't present on the
> commandline.
>
> This is not consistent with how choose_kernel_location() decides whether
> it will randomize kernel load base.
>
> Namely, CONFIG_HIBERNATION disables kASLR (unless "kaslr" option is
> explicitly specified on kernel commandline), which makes the state space
> larger than what module loader is looking at. IOW CONFIG_HIBERNATION &&
> CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE is a valid config option, kASLR wouldn't be applied
> by default in that case, but module loader is not aware of that.
>
> Instead of fixing the logic in module.c, this patch takes more generic
> aproach, and exposes __KERNEL_OFFSET macro, which calculates the real
> offset that has been established by choose_kernel_location() during boot.
> This can be used later by other kernel code as well (such as, but not
> limited to, live patching).
>
> OOPS offset dumper and module loader are converted to that they make use
> of this macro as well.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@xxxxxxx>
Ah, yes! This is a good clean up. Thanks! I do see, however, one
corner case remaining: kASLR randomized to 0 offset. This will force
module ASLR off, which I think is a mistake. Perhaps we need to export
the kaslr state as a separate item to be checked directly, instead of
using __KERNEL_OFFSET?
-Kees
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/page_types.h | 4 ++++
> arch/x86/kernel/module.c | 10 +---------
> arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 4 ++--
> 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/page_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/page_types.h
> index f97fbe3..7f18eaf 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/page_types.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/page_types.h
> @@ -46,6 +46,10 @@
>
> #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
>
> +/* Return kASLR relocation offset */
> +extern char _text[];
> +#define __KERNEL_OFFSET ((unsigned long)&_text - __START_KERNEL)
> +
> extern int devmem_is_allowed(unsigned long pagenr);
>
> extern unsigned long max_low_pfn_mapped;
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/module.c b/arch/x86/kernel/module.c
> index e69f988..d236bd2 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/module.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/module.c
> @@ -46,21 +46,13 @@ do { \
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE
> static unsigned long module_load_offset;
> -static int randomize_modules = 1;
>
> /* Mutex protects the module_load_offset. */
> static DEFINE_MUTEX(module_kaslr_mutex);
>
> -static int __init parse_nokaslr(char *p)
> -{
> - randomize_modules = 0;
> - return 0;
> -}
> -early_param("nokaslr", parse_nokaslr);
> -
> static unsigned long int get_module_load_offset(void)
> {
> - if (randomize_modules) {
> + if (__KERNEL_OFFSET) {
> mutex_lock(&module_kaslr_mutex);
> /*
> * Calculate the module_load_offset the first time this
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
> index c4648ada..08124a1 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
> @@ -833,8 +833,8 @@ dump_kernel_offset(struct notifier_block *self, unsigned long v, void *p)
> {
> pr_emerg("Kernel Offset: 0x%lx from 0x%lx "
> "(relocation range: 0x%lx-0x%lx)\n",
> - (unsigned long)&_text - __START_KERNEL, __START_KERNEL,
> - __START_KERNEL_map, MODULES_VADDR-1);
> + __KERNEL_OFFSET, __START_KERNEL, __START_KERNEL_map,
> + MODULES_VADDR-1);
>
> return 0;
> }
>
> --
> Jiri Kosina
> SUSE Labs
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
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