I can't comment on the concept, but have one nit.
On Mon, Jan 06, 2014 at 07:30:30AM -0800, William Roberts wrote:
> +static void audit_log_cmdline(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk,
> + struct audit_context *context)
> +{
> + int res;
> + char *buf;
> + char *msg = "(null)";
> + audit_log_format(ab, " cmdline=");
> +
> + /* Not cached */
> + if (!context->cmdline) {
> + buf = kmalloc(PATH_MAX, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!buf)
> + goto out;
> + res = get_cmdline(tsk, buf, PATH_MAX);
> + /* Ensure NULL terminated */
> + if (buf[res-1] != '\0')
> + buf[res-1] = '\0';
This accesses memory below the buffer if get_cmdline returned 0, which I
believe will be the case when someone jokingly unmaps the area (all
maybe when it is swapped out but can't be swapped in due to I/O errors).
Also since you are just putting 0 in there anyway I don't see much point
in testing for it.
> + context->cmdline = buf;
> + }
> + msg = context->cmdline;
> +out:
> + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, msg);
> +}
> +
--
Mateusz Guzik
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