Re: [syzbot] [fs?] [mm?] KCSAN: data-race in bprm_execve / copy_fs (4)

[Kees Cook <kees@xxxxxxxxxx>]

On Sat, Mar 22, 2025 at 01:00:08AM +0000, Al Viro wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 21, 2025 at 09:45:39AM +0100, Christian Brauner wrote:
> 
> > Afaict, the only way this data race can happen is if we jump to the
> > cleanup label and then reset current->fs->in_exec. If the execve was
> > successful there's no one to race us with CLONE_FS obviously because we
> > took down all other threads.
> 
> Not really.

Yeah, you found it. Thank you!

> 1) A enters check_unsafe_execve(), sets ->in_exec to 1
> 2) B enters check_unsafe_execve(), sets ->in_exec to 1

With 3 threads A, B, and C already running, fs->users == 3, so steps (1)
and (2) happily pass.

> 3) A calls exec_binprm(), fails (bad binary)
> 4) A clears ->in_exec
> 5) C calls clone(2) with CLONE_FS and spawns D - ->in_exec is 0

D's creation bumps fs->users == 4.

> 6) B gets through exec_binprm(), kills A and C, but not D.
> 7) B clears ->in_exec, returns
> 
> Result: B and D share ->fs, B runs suid binary.
> 
> Had (5) happened prior to (2), (2) wouldn't have set ->in_exec;
> had (5) happened prior to (4), clone() would've failed; had
> (5) been delayed past (6), there wouldn't have been a thread
> to call clone().
> 
> But in the window between (4) and (6), clone() doesn't see
> execve() in progress and check_unsafe_execve() has already
> been done, so it hadn't seen the extra thread.
> 
> IOW, it really is racy.  It's a counter, not a flag.

Yeah, I would agree. Totally untested patch:

diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index 506cd411f4ac..988b8621c079 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -1632,7 +1632,7 @@ static void check_unsafe_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	if (p->fs->users > n_fs)
 		bprm->unsafe |= LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE;
 	else
-		p->fs->in_exec = 1;
+		refcount_inc(&p->fs->in_exec);
 	spin_unlock(&p->fs->lock);
 }
 
@@ -1862,7 +1862,7 @@ static int bprm_execve(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 
 	sched_mm_cid_after_execve(current);
 	/* execve succeeded */
-	current->fs->in_exec = 0;
+	refcount_dec(&current->fs->in_exec);
 	current->in_execve = 0;
 	rseq_execve(current);
 	user_events_execve(current);
@@ -1881,7 +1881,7 @@ static int bprm_execve(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 		force_fatal_sig(SIGSEGV);
 
 	sched_mm_cid_after_execve(current);
-	current->fs->in_exec = 0;
+	refcount_dec(&current->fs->in_exec);
 	current->in_execve = 0;
 
 	return retval;
diff --git a/fs/fs_struct.c b/fs/fs_struct.c
index 64c2d0814ed6..df46b873c425 100644
--- a/fs/fs_struct.c
+++ b/fs/fs_struct.c
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ struct fs_struct *copy_fs_struct(struct fs_struct *old)
 	/* We don't need to lock fs - think why ;-) */
 	if (fs) {
 		fs->users = 1;
-		fs->in_exec = 0;
+		fs->in_exec = REFCOUNT_INIT(0);
 		spin_lock_init(&fs->lock);
 		seqcount_spinlock_init(&fs->seq, &fs->lock);
 		fs->umask = old->umask;
diff --git a/include/linux/fs_struct.h b/include/linux/fs_struct.h
index 783b48dedb72..aebc0b7aedb9 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs_struct.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs_struct.h
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ struct fs_struct {
 	spinlock_t lock;
 	seqcount_spinlock_t seq;
 	int umask;
-	int in_exec;
+	refcount_t in_exec;
 	struct path root, pwd;
 } __randomize_layout;
 
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index 735405a9c5f3..8b427045fd86 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -1767,7 +1767,7 @@ static int copy_fs(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
 		/* tsk->fs is already what we want */
 		spin_lock(&fs->lock);
 		/* "users" and "in_exec" locked for check_unsafe_exec() */
-		if (fs->in_exec) {
+		if (refcount_read(&fs->in_exec)) {
 			spin_unlock(&fs->lock);
 			return -EAGAIN;
 		}

-- 
Kees Cook