On Wed, Feb 19, 2025 at 6:25 PM Kees Cook <kees@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > On Fri, Feb 14, 2025 at 09:44:59PM +0900, Harry (Hyeonggon) Yoo wrote: > > On Fri, Feb 14, 2025 at 06:02:52PM +0800, Huacai Chen wrote: > > > On Fri, Feb 14, 2025 at 5:33 PM Harry (Hyeonggon) Yoo > > > <42.hyeyoo@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > > > > > On Thu, Feb 13, 2025 at 11:20:22AM +0800, Huacai Chen wrote: > > > > > Hi, Harry, > > > > > > > > > > On Wed, Feb 12, 2025 at 11:39 PM Harry (Hyeonggon) Yoo > > > > > <42.hyeyoo@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > > > On Wed, Feb 12, 2025 at 11:17 PM Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Hibernation assumes the memory layout after resume be the same as that > > > > > > > before sleep, but CONFIG_RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES breaks this assumption. > > > > > > > > > > > > Could you please elaborate what do you mean by > > > > > > hibernation assumes 'the memory layout' after resume be the same as that > > > > > > before sleep? > > > > > > > > > > > > I don't understand how updating random_kmalloc_seed breaks resuming from > > > > > > hibernation. Changing random_kmalloc_seed affects which kmalloc caches > > > > > > newly allocated objects are from, but it should not affect the objects that are > > > > > > already allocated (before hibernation). > > > > > > > > > > When resuming, the booting kernel should switch to the target kernel, > > > > > if the address of switch code (from the booting kernel) is the > > > > > effective data of the target kernel, then the switch code may be > > > > > overwritten. > > > > > > > > Hmm... I'm still missing some pieces. > > > > How is the kernel binary overwritten when slab allocations are randomized? > > > > > > > > Also, I'm not sure if it's even safe to assume that the memory layout is the > > > > same across boots. But I'm not an expert on swsusp anyway... > > > > > > > > It'd be really helpful for linux-pm folks to clarify 1) what are the > > > > (architecture-independent) assumptions are for swsusp to work, and > > > > 2) how architectures dealt with other randomization features like kASLR... > > > > > > > [+Cc few more people that worked on slab hardening] > > > > > I'm sorry to confuse you. Binary overwriting is indeed caused by > > > kASLR, so at least on LoongArch we should disable kASLR for > > > hibernation. > > > > Understood. > > > > > Random kmalloc is another story, on LoongArch it breaks smpboot when > > > resuming, the details are: > > > 1, LoongArch uses kmalloc() family to allocate idle_task's > > > stack/thread_info and other data structures. > > > 2, If random kmalloc is enabled, idle_task's stack in the booting > > > kernel may be other things in the target kernel. > > > > Slab hardening features try so hard to prevent such predictability. > > For example, SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM could also randomize the address > > kmalloc objects are allocated at. > > > > Rather than hacking CONFIG_RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES like this, we could > > have a single option to disable slab hardening features that makes > > the address unpredictable. > > > > It'd be nice to have something like ARCH_SUPPORTS_SLAB_RANDOM which > > some hardening features depend on. And then let some arches conditionally > > not select ARCH_SUPPORTS_SLAB_RANDOM if hibernation's enabled > > (at cost of less hardening)? > > I find this whole thread confusing. :) Hibernation should already do > whatever it need to to get out of the way of the kernel it is restoring > to memory. The random locations shouldn't matter at all: they're all > stored in the image. I am not a hibernation expert, but my understanding > is that the "resume" kernel moves itself out of the way to restore the > KASLR-ed hibernation image and puts everything back exactly as it was. > Randomization should not matter at all: it's just simply "put everything > back where it was". Exactly. > Yes, the tricky part is the "move itself out of the way", but that's > required for any kernel that support being relocatable (a prerequisite > for KASLR), and KASLR is just an aggressive form of "the relocatable > kernel might be anywhere" beyond just different boot loaders putting it > in a handful of different potential offsets. Right. Thanks!
