Historiaclly the code relied on access_ok() to validate the address range. Commit 26f4c328079d7 added an explicit wrap check before access_ok(). Commit c28b1fc70390d then changed the wrap test to use check_add_overflow(). Commit 6014bc27561f2 relaxed the checks in x86-64's access_ok() and added an explicit check for TASK_SIZE here to make up for it. That left a pointless access_ok() call with its associated 'lfence' that can never actually fail. So just delete the test. Signed-off-by: David Laight <david.laight.linux@xxxxxxxxx> --- mm/gup.c | 4 +--- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/gup.c b/mm/gup.c index 3883b307780e..79a3d2228bf9 100644 --- a/mm/gup.c +++ b/mm/gup.c @@ -2757,7 +2757,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_user_pages_unlocked); * * *) ptes can be read atomically by the architecture. * - * *) access_ok is sufficient to validate userspace address ranges. + * *) valid user addesses are below TASK_MAX_SIZE * * The last two assumptions can be relaxed by the addition of helper functions. * @@ -3411,8 +3411,6 @@ static int gup_fast_fallback(unsigned long start, unsigned long nr_pages, return -EOVERFLOW; if (end > TASK_SIZE_MAX) return -EFAULT; - if (unlikely(!access_ok((void __user *)start, len))) - return -EFAULT; nr_pinned = gup_fast(start, end, gup_flags, pages); if (nr_pinned == nr_pages || gup_flags & FOLL_FAST_ONLY) -- 2.39.5
