Ping.
regards,
dan carpenter
On Wed, Dec 04, 2024 at 03:07:15PM +0300, Dan Carpenter wrote:
> Most of these sizes and counts are capped at 256MB so the math doesn't
> result in an integer overflow. The "relocs" count needs to be checked
> as well. Otherwise on 32bit systems the calculation of "full_data"
> could be wrong.
>
> full_data = data_len + relocs * sizeof(unsigned long);
>
> Fixes: c995ee28d29d ("binfmt_flat: prevent kernel dammage from corrupted executable headers")
> Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@xxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> fs/binfmt_flat.c | 2 +-
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/binfmt_flat.c b/fs/binfmt_flat.c
> index 390808ce935d..b5b5ca1a44f7 100644
> --- a/fs/binfmt_flat.c
> +++ b/fs/binfmt_flat.c
> @@ -478,7 +478,7 @@ static int load_flat_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
> * 28 bits (256 MB) is way more than reasonable in this case.
> * If some top bits are set we have probable binary corruption.
> */
> - if ((text_len | data_len | bss_len | stack_len | full_data) >> 28) {
> + if ((text_len | data_len | bss_len | stack_len | relocs | full_data) >> 28) {
> pr_err("bad header\n");
> ret = -ENOEXEC;
> goto err;
> --
> 2.45.2
