In 782f8906f805 the freeing of kfence objects was moved from deep
inside do_free_slab to the wrapper functions outside. This is a nice
change, but unfortunately it missed one spot in __kmem_cache_free_bulk.
This results in a crash like this:
BUG skbuff_head_cache (Tainted: G S B E ): Padding overwritten. 0xffff88907fea0f00-0xffff88907fea0fff @offset=3840
slab_err (mm/slub.c:1129)
free_to_partial_list (mm/slub.c:? mm/slub.c:4036)
slab_pad_check (mm/slub.c:864 mm/slub.c:1290)
check_slab (mm/slub.c:?)
free_to_partial_list (mm/slub.c:3171 mm/slub.c:4036)
kmem_cache_alloc_bulk (mm/slub.c:? mm/slub.c:4495 mm/slub.c:4586 mm/slub.c:4635)
napi_build_skb (net/core/skbuff.c:348 net/core/skbuff.c:527 net/core/skbuff.c:549)
All the other callers to do_free_slab appear to be ok.
Add a kfence_free check in __kmem_cache_free_bulk to avoid the crash.
Reported-by: Chris Mason <clm@xxxxxxxx>
Fixes: 782f8906f805 ("mm/slub: free KFENCE objects in slab_free_hook()")
Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@xxxxxxxxxxx>
---
mm/slub.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
index 3520acaf9afa..c9d8a2497fd6 100644
--- a/mm/slub.c
+++ b/mm/slub.c
@@ -4690,6 +4690,9 @@ static void __kmem_cache_free_bulk(struct kmem_cache *s, size_t size, void **p)
if (!df.slab)
continue;
+ if (kfence_free(df.freelist))
+ continue;
+
do_slab_free(df.s, df.slab, df.freelist, df.tail, df.cnt,
_RET_IP_);
} while (likely(size));
--
2.45.2
