On Wed, May 29, 2024 at 2:46 PM Barnabás Pőcze <pobrn@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > Hi > > > 2024. május 29., szerda 23:30 keltezéssel, Jeff Xu <jeffxu@xxxxxxxxxx> írta: > > > Hi David and Barnabás > > > > On Fri, May 24, 2024 at 7:15 AM David Rheinsberg <david@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > > > Hi > > > > > > On Fri, May 24, 2024, at 5:39 AM, jeffxu@xxxxxxxxxxxx wrote: > > > > From: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@xxxxxxxxxx> > > > > > > > > By default, memfd_create() creates a non-sealable MFD, unless the > > > > MFD_ALLOW_SEALING flag is set. > > > > > > > > When the MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL flag is initially introduced, the MFD created > > > > with that flag is sealable, even though MFD_ALLOW_SEALING is not set. > > > > This patch changes MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL to be non-sealable by default, > > > > unless MFD_ALLOW_SEALING is explicitly set. > > > > > > > > This is a non-backward compatible change. However, as MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL > > > > is new, we expect not many applications will rely on the nature of > > > > MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL being sealable. In most cases, the application already > > > > sets MFD_ALLOW_SEALING if they need a sealable MFD. > > > > > > This does not really reflect the effort that went into this. Shouldn't this be something along the lines of: > > > > > > This is a non-backward compatible change. However, MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL > > > was only recently introduced and a codesearch revealed no breaking > > > users apart from dbus-broker unit-tests (which have a patch pending > > > and explicitly support this change). > > > > > Actually, I think we might need to hold on to this change. With debian > > code search, I found more codes that already use MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL > > without MFD_ALLOW_SEALING. e.g. systemd [1], [2] [3] > > Yes, I have looked at those as well, and as far as I could tell, > they are not affected. Have I missed something? > In the example, the MFD was created then passed into somewhere else (safe_fork_full, open_serialization_fd, etc.), the scope and usage of mfd isn't that clear to me, you might have checked all the user cases. In addition, MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL exists in libc and rust and go lib. I don't know if debian code search is sufficient to cover enough apps . There is a certain risk. Fundamentally, I'm not convinced that making MFD default-non-sealable has meaningful benefit, especially when MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL is new. > > Regards, > Barnabás > > > > > > I'm not sure if this will break more applications not-knowingly that > > have started relying on MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL being sealable. The feature > > has been out for more than a year. > > > > Would you consider my augments in [4] to make MFD to be sealable by default ? > > > > At this moment, I'm willing to add a document to clarify that > > MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL is sealable by default, and that an app that needs > > non-sealable MFD can set SEAL_SEAL. Because both MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL > > and vm.memfd_noexec are new, I don't think it breaks the existing > > ABI, and vm.memfd_noexec=0 is there for backward compatibility > > reasons. Besides, I honestly think there is little reason that MFD > > needs to be non-sealable by default. There might be few rare cases, > > but the majority of apps don't need that. On the flip side, the fact > > that MFD is set up to be sealable by default is a nice bonus for an > > app - it makes it easier for apps to use the sealing feature. > > > > What do you think ? > > > > Thanks > > -Jeff > > > > [1] https://codesearch.debian.net/search?q=MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL > > [2] https://codesearch.debian.net/show?file=systemd_256~rc3-5%2Fsrc%2Fhome%2Fhomed-home.c&line=1274 > > [3] https://sources.debian.org/src/elogind/255.5-1debian1/src/shared/serialize.c/?hl=558#L558 > > [4] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CALmYWFuPBEM2DE97mQvB2eEgSO9Dvt=uO9OewMhGfhGCY66Hbw@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx/ > > > > > > > > Additionally, this enhances the useability of pid namespace sysctl > > > > vm.memfd_noexec. When vm.memfd_noexec equals 1 or 2, the kernel will > > > > add MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL if mfd_create does not specify MFD_EXEC or > > > > MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL, and the addition of MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL enables the MFD > > > > to be sealable. This means, any application that does not desire this > > > > behavior will be unable to utilize vm.memfd_noexec = 1 or 2 to > > > > migrate/enforce non-executable MFD. This adjustment ensures that > > > > applications can anticipate that the sealable characteristic will > > > > remain unmodified by vm.memfd_noexec. > > > > > > > > This patch was initially developed by Barnabás Pőcze, and Barnabás > > > > used Debian Code Search and GitHub to try to find potential breakages > > > > and could only find a single one. Dbus-broker's memfd_create() wrapper > > > > is aware of this implicit `MFD_ALLOW_SEALING` behavior, and tries to > > > > work around it [1]. This workaround will break. Luckily, this only > > > > affects the test suite, it does not affect > > > > the normal operations of dbus-broker. There is a PR with a fix[2]. In > > > > addition, David Rheinsberg also raised similar fix in [3] > > > > > > > > [1]: > > > > https://github.com/bus1/dbus-broker/blob/9eb0b7e5826fc76cad7b025bc46f267d4a8784cb/src/util/misc.c#L114 > > > > [2]: https://github.com/bus1/dbus-broker/pull/366 > > > > [3]: > > > > https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230714114753.170814-1-david@xxxxxxxxxxxx/ > > > > > > > > Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > > > > Fixes: 105ff5339f498a ("mm/memfd: add MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXEC") > > > > Signed-off-by: Barnabás Pőcze <pobrn@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> > > > > Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@xxxxxxxxxx> > > > > Reviewed-by: David Rheinsberg <david@xxxxxxxxxxxx> > > > > > > Looks good! Thanks! > > > David > >
