Hi On Thu, May 23, 2024, at 4:25 AM, Barnabás Pőcze wrote: > 2024. május 23., csütörtök 1:23 keltezéssel, Andrew Morton > <akpm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> írta: >> It's a change to a userspace API, yes? Please let's have a detailed >> description of why this is OK. Why it won't affect any existing users. > > Yes, it is a uAPI change. To trigger user visible change, a program has to > > - create a memfd > - with MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL, > - without MFD_ALLOW_SEALING; > - try to add seals / check the seals. > > This change in essence reverts the kernel's behaviour to that of Linux > <6.3, where > only `MFD_ALLOW_SEALING` enabled sealing. If a program works correctly > on those > kernels, it will likely work correctly after this change. > > I have looked through Debian Code Search and GitHub, searching for > `MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL`. > And I could find only a single breakage that this change would case: > dbus-broker > has its own memfd_create() wrapper that is aware of this implicit > `MFD_ALLOW_SEALING` > behaviour[0], and tries to work around it. This workaround will break. > Luckily, > however, as far as I could tell this only affects the test suite of > dbus-broker, > not its normal operations, so I believe it should be fine. I have > prepared a PR > with a fix[1]. We asked for exactly this fix before, so I very much support this. Our test-suite in `dbus-broker` merely verifies what the current kernel behavior is (just like the kernel selftests). I am certainly ok if the kernel breaks it. I will gladly adapt the test-suite. Previous discussion was in: [PATCH] memfd: support MFD_NOEXEC alongside MFD_EXEC https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230714114753.170814-1-david@xxxxxxxxxxxx/ Note that this fix is particularly important in combination with `vm.memfd_noexec=2`, since this breaks existing user-space by enabling sealing on all memfds unconditionally. I also encourage backporting to stable kernels. Reviewed-by: David Rheinsberg <david@xxxxxxxxxxxx> Thanks David