From: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
It is unlikely that application calls mm syscall, such as mprotect,
on already sealed mappings, adding branch prediction hint.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Suggested-by: Pedro Falcato <pedro.falcato@xxxxxxxxx>
---
mm/madvise.c | 2 +-
mm/mmap.c | 4 ++--
mm/mprotect.c | 2 +-
mm/mremap.c | 4 ++--
mm/mseal.c | 6 +++---
5 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/mm/madvise.c b/mm/madvise.c
index f7d589534e82..ea2e4f6981e2 100644
--- a/mm/madvise.c
+++ b/mm/madvise.c
@@ -1442,7 +1442,7 @@ int do_madvise(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start, size_t len_in, int beh
* Check if the address range is sealed for do_madvise().
* can_modify_mm_madv assumes we have acquired the lock on MM.
*/
- if (!can_modify_mm_madv(mm, start, end, behavior)) {
+ if (unlikely(!can_modify_mm_madv(mm, start, end, behavior))) {
error = -EPERM;
goto out;
}
diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
index 4b80076c319e..6bc0b35ee1f9 100644
--- a/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/mm/mmap.c
@@ -2697,7 +2697,7 @@ int do_vmi_munmap(struct vma_iterator *vmi, struct mm_struct *mm,
* Prevent unmapping a sealed VMA.
* can_modify_mm assumes we have acquired the lock on MM.
*/
- if (!can_modify_mm(mm, start, end))
+ if (unlikely(!can_modify_mm(mm, start, end)))
return -EPERM;
/* arch_unmap() might do unmaps itself. */
@@ -3120,7 +3120,7 @@ int do_vma_munmap(struct vma_iterator *vmi, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
* Prevent unmapping a sealed VMA.
* can_modify_mm assumes we have acquired the lock on MM.
*/
- if (!can_modify_mm(mm, start, end))
+ if (unlikely(!can_modify_mm(mm, start, end)))
return -EPERM;
arch_unmap(mm, start, end);
diff --git a/mm/mprotect.c b/mm/mprotect.c
index b30b2494bfcd..465c6cd9578c 100644
--- a/mm/mprotect.c
+++ b/mm/mprotect.c
@@ -748,7 +748,7 @@ static int do_mprotect_pkey(unsigned long start, size_t len,
* checking if memory is sealed.
* can_modify_mm assumes we have acquired the lock on MM.
*/
- if (!can_modify_mm(current->mm, start, end)) {
+ if (unlikely(!can_modify_mm(current->mm, start, end))) {
error = -EPERM;
goto out;
}
diff --git a/mm/mremap.c b/mm/mremap.c
index d69b438dcf83..223552901f14 100644
--- a/mm/mremap.c
+++ b/mm/mremap.c
@@ -912,7 +912,7 @@ static unsigned long mremap_to(unsigned long addr, unsigned long old_len,
*
* can_modify_mm assumes we have acquired the lock on MM.
*/
- if (!can_modify_mm(mm, addr, addr + old_len))
+ if (unlikely(!can_modify_mm(mm, addr, addr + old_len)))
return -EPERM;
if (flags & MREMAP_FIXED) {
@@ -1087,7 +1087,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(mremap, unsigned long, addr, unsigned long, old_len,
* Place can_modify_mm here so we can keep the logic related to
* shrink/expand together.
*/
- if (!can_modify_mm(mm, addr, addr + old_len)) {
+ if (unlikely(!can_modify_mm(mm, addr, addr + old_len))) {
ret = -EPERM;
goto out;
}
diff --git a/mm/mseal.c b/mm/mseal.c
index daadac4b8125..bf783bba8ed0 100644
--- a/mm/mseal.c
+++ b/mm/mseal.c
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ static inline void set_vma_sealed(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
*/
static bool can_modify_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
- if (vma_is_sealed(vma))
+ if (unlikely(vma_is_sealed(vma)))
return false;
return true;
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ bool can_modify_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
/* going through each vma to check. */
for_each_vma_range(vmi, vma, end) {
- if (!can_modify_vma(vma))
+ if (unlikely(!can_modify_vma(vma)))
return false;
}
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ bool can_modify_mm_madv(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start, unsigned long
/* going through each vma to check. */
for_each_vma_range(vmi, vma, end)
- if (is_ro_anon(vma) && !can_modify_vma(vma))
+ if (unlikely(is_ro_anon(vma) && !can_modify_vma(vma)))
return false;
/* Allow by default. */
--
2.44.0.769.g3c40516874-goog
