Re: [PATCH v4 3/5] mm, security: Add lsm hook for memory policy adjustment

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

 



On Sat, Dec 9, 2023 at 1:30 AM Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> On 12/8/2023 1:06 AM, Yafang Shao wrote:
> > In a containerized environment, independent memory binding by a user can
> > lead to unexpected system issues or disrupt tasks being run by other users
> > on the same server. If a user genuinely requires memory binding, we will
> > allocate dedicated servers to them by leveraging kubelet deployment.
> >
> > At present, users have the capability to bind their memory to a specific
> > node without explicit agreement or authorization from us. Consequently, a
> > new LSM hook is introduced to mitigate this. This implementation allows us
> > to exercise fine-grained control over memory policy adjustments within our
> > container environment
>
> I wonder if security_vm_enough_memory() ought to be reimplemented as
> an option to security_set_mempolicy(). I'm not convinced either way,
> but I can argue both.

The function security_vm_enough_memory() serves to verify the
permissibility of a new memory map, while security_set_mempolicy()
comes into play post-memory map allocation. Expanding
security_vm_enough_memory() to include memory policy checks might
potentially lead to regressions. Therefore, I would prefer to
introduce a new function, security_set_mempolicy(), to handle these
checks separately.

-- 
Regards
Yafang





[Index of Archives]     [Linux ARM Kernel]     [Linux ARM]     [Linux Omap]     [Fedora ARM]     [IETF Annouce]     [Bugtraq]     [Linux OMAP]     [Linux MIPS]     [eCos]     [Asterisk Internet PBX]     [Linux API]

  Powered by Linux