Re: [RFC PATCH -mm 0/4] mm, security, bpf: Fine-grained control over memory policy adjustments with lsm bpf

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On Wed, Nov 15, 2023 at 12:58 AM Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> On 11/14/2023 3:59 AM, Yafang Shao wrote:
> > On Tue, Nov 14, 2023 at 6:15 PM Michal Hocko <mhocko@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >> On Mon 13-11-23 11:15:06, Yafang Shao wrote:
> >>> On Mon, Nov 13, 2023 at 12:45 AM Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >>>> On 11/11/2023 11:34 PM, Yafang Shao wrote:
> >>>>> Background
> >>>>> ==========
> >>>>>
> >>>>> In our containerized environment, we've identified unexpected OOM events
> >>>>> where the OOM-killer terminates tasks despite having ample free memory.
> >>>>> This anomaly is traced back to tasks within a container using mbind(2) to
> >>>>> bind memory to a specific NUMA node. When the allocated memory on this node
> >>>>> is exhausted, the OOM-killer, prioritizing tasks based on oom_score,
> >>>>> indiscriminately kills tasks. This becomes more critical with guaranteed
> >>>>> tasks (oom_score_adj: -998) aggravating the issue.
> >>>> Is there some reason why you can't fix the callers of mbind(2)?
> >>>> This looks like an user space configuration error rather than a
> >>>> system security issue.
> >>> It appears my initial description may have caused confusion. In this
> >>> scenario, the caller is an unprivileged user lacking any capabilities.
> >>> While a privileged user, such as root, experiencing this issue might
> >>> indicate a user space configuration error, the concerning aspect is
> >>> the potential for an unprivileged user to disrupt the system easily.
> >>> If this is perceived as a misconfiguration, the question arises: What
> >>> is the correct configuration to prevent an unprivileged user from
> >>> utilizing mbind(2)?"
> >> How is this any different than a non NUMA (mbind) situation?
> > In a UMA system, each gigabyte of memory carries the same cost.
> > Conversely, in a NUMA architecture, opting to confine processes within
> > a specific NUMA node incurs additional costs. In the worst-case
> > scenario, if all containers opt to bind their memory exclusively to
> > specific nodes, it will result in significant memory wastage.
>
> That still sounds like you've misconfigured your containers such
> that they expect to get more memory than is available, and that
> they have more control over it than they really do.

And again: What configuration method is suitable to limit user control
over memory policy adjustments, besides the heavyweight seccomp
approach?

--
Regards
Yafang





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