On 05. 03. 23, 18:54, Samuel Thibault wrote:
Kees Cook, le ven. 03 mars 2023 14:07:04 -0800, a ecrit:
#define max_font_width 64
#define max_font_height 128
#define max_font_glyphs 512
#define max_font_size (max_font_glyphs*max_font_width*max_font_height)
...
font.data = kvmalloc(max_font_size, GFP_KERNEL);
...
if (op->data && copy_to_user(op->data, font.data, c))
rc = -EFAULT;
it is correctly seeing "c" (4194560 in the report) as larger than
"max_font_size" (4194304, seen reported by "folio_size(folio)"). The
"c" calculation comes from:
unsigned int vpitch = op->op == KD_FONT_OP_GET_TALL ? op->height : 32;
...
rc = vc->vc_sw->con_font_get(vc, &font, vpitch);
...
c = (font.width+7)/8 * vpitch * font.charcount;
So yes, 4194560 is larger than 4194304, and a memory exposure was,
in fact, blocked here.
Given the recent work in this area, I'm not sure which calculation is
wrong, max_font_size or c. Samuel?
They are not wrong. It's the vpitch value (coming from userland's
op.height) which is out of bound and missing a check.
The patch below should be fixing it, could you check?
I don't know how I am supposed to properly reference the syzbot report
etc., could somebody used to the process handle submitting the fix?
It's as simple as adding:
Reported-by: syzbot+3af17071816b61e807ed@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
to the tags.
VT: Protect KD_FONT_OP_GET_TALL from unbound access
In ioctl(KD_FONT_OP_GET_TALL), userland tells through op->height which
vpitch should be used to copy over the font. In con_font_get, we were
not checking that it is within the maximum height value, and thus
userland could make the vc->vc_sw->con_font_get(vc, &font, vpitch);
call possibly overflow the allocated max_font_size bytes, and the
copy_to_user(op->data, font.data, c) call possibly read out of that
allocated buffer.
By checking vpitch against max_font_height, the max_font_size buffer
will always be large enough for the vc->vc_sw->con_font_get(vc, &font,
vpitch) call (since we already prevent loading a font larger than that),
and c = (font.width+7)/8 * vpitch * font.charcount will always remain
below max_font_size.
Fixes: 24d69384bcd3 ("VT: Add KD_FONT_OP_SET/GET_TALL operations")
Reviewed-by: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Samuel Thibault <samuel.thibault@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
diff --git a/drivers/tty/vt/vt.c b/drivers/tty/vt/vt.c
index 57a5c23b51d4..3c2ea9c098f7 100644
--- a/drivers/tty/vt/vt.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/vt/vt.c
@@ -4545,6 +4545,9 @@ static int con_font_get(struct vc_data *vc, struct console_font_op *op)
int c;
unsigned int vpitch = op->op == KD_FONT_OP_GET_TALL ? op->height : 32;
+ if (vpitch > max_font_height)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
if (op->data) {
font.data = kvmalloc(max_font_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!font.data)
--
js
