Re: [PATCH v2 13/13] mm/gup: move private gup FOLL_ flags to internal.h

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On Mon, 30 Jan 2023 14:24:40 -0400
Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

> On Mon, Jan 30, 2023 at 07:21:04PM +0100, Claudio Imbrenda wrote:
> > On Thu, 26 Jan 2023 12:35:37 -0400
> > Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >   
> > > On Thu, Jan 26, 2023 at 04:39:02PM +0100, Claudio Imbrenda wrote:
> > >   
> > > > I can tell you that the original goal of that function is to make sure
> > > > that there are no extra references. in particular, we want to prevent
> > > > I/O of any kind to be ongoing while the page becomes secure. (the I/O
> > > > will fail and, depending on which device it was, the whole system might
> > > > end up in a rather unhappy state)    
> > > 
> > > Sure, but if there is concurrent IO you just try again right? It
> > > doesn't wait for refs to drop for instance.
> > > 
> > > So make the lock_page work the same way:  
> > 
> > the more I look at this, the less I understand why I wrote the code
> > like that. I do have a comment, though
> >   
> > > 
> > > diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c b/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c
> > > index 9f18a4af9c1319..847ee50b8672c6 100644
> > > --- a/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c
> > > +++ b/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c
> > > @@ -193,20 +193,11 @@ static int expected_page_refs(struct page *page)
> > >  }
> > >  
> > >  static int make_secure_pte(pte_t *ptep, unsigned long addr,
> > > -			   struct page *exp_page, struct uv_cb_header *uvcb)
> > > +			   struct page *page, struct uv_cb_header *uvcb)
> > >  {
> > >  	pte_t entry = READ_ONCE(*ptep);
> > > -	struct page *page;
> > >  	int expected, cc = 0;
> > >  
> > > -	if (!pte_present(entry))
> > > -		return -ENXIO;
> > > -	if (pte_val(entry) & _PAGE_INVALID)
> > > -		return -ENXIO;
> > > -
> > > -	page = pte_page(entry);
> > > -	if (page != exp_page)
> > > -		return -ENXIO;
> > >  	if (PageWriteback(page))
> > >  		return -EAGAIN;
> > >  	expected = expected_page_refs(page);
> > > @@ -304,17 +295,25 @@ int gmap_make_secure(struct gmap *gmap, unsigned long gaddr, void *uvcb)
> > >  		goto out;
> > >  
> > >  	rc = -ENXIO;
> > > -	page = follow_page(vma, uaddr, FOLL_WRITE);
> > > -	if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(page))
> > > -		goto out;
> > > -
> > > -	lock_page(page);
> > >  	ptep = get_locked_pte(gmap->mm, uaddr, &ptelock);
> > > +
> > > +	if (!pte_present(entry))
> > > +		goto out_unlock_pte;
> > > +	if (pte_val(entry) & _PAGE_INVALID)
> > > +		goto out_unlock_pte;  
> > 
> > I guess we also need to make sure the page was writable?
> > FOLL_WRITE made sure of that
> > 
> > so I guess something like:
> > 
> > if (!pte_write(entry))
> > 	goto out_unlock_pte;  
> 
> Probably, that looks like an existing race that it wasn't re-checked :\
> 
> Jason

how do we want to proceed with this?

I can write a patch based on the above and see if anything breaks, but
it will take some thinking and testing and reviewing before I'll be
comfortable with it.




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