Re: [PATCHv11 05/16] x86/uaccess: Provide untagged_addr() and remove tags before address check

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On 10/24/22 17:17, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
untagged_addr() is a helper used by the core-mm to strip tag bits and
get the address to the canonical shape. In only handles userspace
addresses. The untagging mask is stored in mmu_context and will be set
on enabling LAM for the process.

The tags must not be included into check whether it's okay to access the
userspace address.

Strip tags in access_ok().

get_user() and put_user() don't use access_ok(), but check access
against TASK_SIZE directly in assembly. Strip tags, before calling into
the assembly helper.

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@xxxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
  arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h         |  3 +++
  arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h | 11 ++++++++
  arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h     | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
  arch/x86/kernel/process.c          |  3 +++
  4 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h
index 002889ca8978..2fdb390040b5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h
@@ -43,6 +43,9 @@ typedef struct {
/* Active LAM mode: X86_CR3_LAM_U48 or X86_CR3_LAM_U57 or 0 (disabled) */
  	unsigned long lam_cr3_mask;
+
+	/* Significant bits of the virtual address. Excludes tag bits. */
+	u64 untag_mask;
  #endif
struct mutex lock;
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
index 69c943b2ae90..5bd3d46685dc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
@@ -100,6 +100,12 @@ static inline unsigned long mm_lam_cr3_mask(struct mm_struct *mm)
  static inline void dup_lam(struct mm_struct *oldmm, struct mm_struct *mm)
  {
  	mm->context.lam_cr3_mask = oldmm->context.lam_cr3_mask;
+	mm->context.untag_mask = oldmm->context.untag_mask;
+}
+
+static inline void mm_reset_untag_mask(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+	mm->context.untag_mask = -1UL;
  }
#else
@@ -112,6 +118,10 @@ static inline unsigned long mm_lam_cr3_mask(struct mm_struct *mm)
  static inline void dup_lam(struct mm_struct *oldmm, struct mm_struct *mm)
  {
  }
+
+static inline void mm_reset_untag_mask(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+}
  #endif
#define enter_lazy_tlb enter_lazy_tlb
@@ -138,6 +148,7 @@ static inline int init_new_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
  		mm->context.execute_only_pkey = -1;
  	}
  #endif
+	mm_reset_untag_mask(mm);
  	init_new_context_ldt(mm);
  	return 0;
  }
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 8bc614cfe21b..c6062c07ccd2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
  #include <linux/compiler.h>
  #include <linux/instrumented.h>
  #include <linux/kasan-checks.h>
+#include <linux/mm_types.h>
  #include <linux/string.h>
  #include <asm/asm.h>
  #include <asm/page.h>
@@ -21,6 +22,30 @@ static inline bool pagefault_disabled(void);
  # define WARN_ON_IN_IRQ()
  #endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+/*
+ * Mask out tag bits from the address.
+ *
+ * Magic with the 'sign' allows to untag userspace pointer without any branches
+ * while leaving kernel addresses intact.
+ */
+#define untagged_addr(mm, addr)	({					\
+	u64 __addr = (__force u64)(addr);				\
+	s64 sign = (s64)__addr >> 63;					\
+	__addr &= (mm)->context.untag_mask | sign;			\
+	(__force __typeof__(addr))__addr;				\
+})
+

I think this implementation is correct, but I'm wondering if there are any callers of untagged_addr that actually need to preserve kernel addresses. Are there? (There certainly *were* back when we had set_fs().)

I'm also mildly uneasy about a potential edge case. Naively, one would expect:

untagged_addr(current->mm, addr) + size ==
untagged_addr(current->mm, addr + size)

at least for an address that is valid enough to be potentially dereferenced. This isn't true any more for size that overflows into the tag bit range.

I *think* we're okay though -- __access_ok requires that addr <= limit - size, so any range that overflows into tag bits will be rejected even if the entire range consists of valid (tagged) user addresses.

So:

Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>





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