On Sat, Oct 22, 2022 at 8:08 PM Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> With all "silently resizing" callers of ksize() refactored, remove the
> logic in ksize() that would allow it to be used to effectively change
> the size of an allocation (bypassing __alloc_size hints, etc). Users
> wanting this feature need to either use kmalloc_size_roundup() before an
> allocation, or use krealloc() directly.
>
> For kfree_sensitive(), move the unpoisoning logic inline. Replace the
> some of the partially open-coded ksize() in __do_krealloc with ksize()
> now that it doesn't perform unpoisoning.
>
> Adjust the KUnit tests to match the new ksize() behavior.
Hi Kees,
> -/* Check that ksize() makes the whole object accessible. */
> +/* Check that ksize() does NOT unpoison whole object. */
> static void ksize_unpoisons_memory(struct kunit *test)
> {
> char *ptr;
> @@ -791,15 +791,17 @@ static void ksize_unpoisons_memory(struct kunit *test)
>
> ptr = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
> KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr);
> +
> real_size = ksize(ptr);
> + KUNIT_EXPECT_GT(test, real_size, size);
>
> OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(ptr);
>
> /* This access shouldn't trigger a KASAN report. */
> - ptr[size] = 'x';
> + ptr[size - 1] = 'x';
>
> /* This one must. */
> - KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ((volatile char *)ptr)[real_size]);
> + KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ((volatile char *)ptr)[real_size - 1]);
How about also accessing ptr[size] here? It would allow for a more
precise checking of the in-object redzone.
>
> kfree(ptr);
> }
Thanks!
