Hi--
On 10/18/22 11:56, Jane Chu wrote:
> On 10/18/2022 5:45 AM, Petr Mladek wrote:
>> On Mon 2022-10-17 19:31:53, Jane Chu wrote:
>>> On 10/17/2022 12:25 PM, Andy Shevchenko wrote:
>>>> On Mon, Oct 17, 2022 at 01:16:11PM -0600, Jane Chu wrote:
>>>>> While debugging a separate issue, it was found that an invalid string
>>>>> pointer could very well contain a non-canical address, such as
>>>>> 0x7665645f63616465. In that case, this line of defense isn't enough
>>>>> to protect the kernel from crashing due to general protection fault
>>>>>
>>>>> if ((unsigned long)ptr < PAGE_SIZE || IS_ERR_VALUE(ptr))
>>>>> return "(efault)";
>>>>>
>>>>> So instead, use kern_addr_valid() to validate the string pointer.
>>>>
>>>> How did you check that value of the (invalid string) pointer?
>>>>
>>>
>>> In the bug scenario, the invalid string pointer was an out-of-bound
>>> string pointer. While the OOB referencing is fixed,
>>
>> Could you please provide more details about the fixed OOB?
>> What exact vsprintf()/printk() call was broken and eventually
>> how it was fixed, please?
>
> For sensitive reason, I'd like to avoid mentioning the specific name of
> the sysfs attribute in the bug, instead, just call it "devX_attrY[]",
> and describe the precise nature of the issue.
>
> devX_attrY[] is a string array, declared and filled at compile time,
> like
> const char const devX_attrY[] = {
> [ATTRY_A] = "Dev X AttributeY A",
> [ATTRY_B] = "Dev X AttributeY B",
> ...
> [ATTRY_G] = "Dev X AttributeY G",
> }
> such that, when user "cat /sys/devices/systems/.../attry_1",
> "Dev X AttributeY B" will show up in the terminal.
> That's it, no more reference to the pointer devX_attrY[ATTRY_B] after that.
>
> The bug was that the index to the array was wrongfully produced,
> leading up to OOB, e.g. devX_attrY[11]. The fix was to fix the
> calculation and that is not an upstream fix.
>
>>
>>> the lingering issue
>>> is that the kernel ought to be able to protect itself, as the pointer
>>> contains a non-canonical address.
>>
>> Was the pointer used only by the vsprintf()?
>> Or was it accessed also by another code, please?
>
> The OOB pointer was used only by vsprintf() for the "cat" sysfs case.
> No other code uses the OOB pointer, verified both by code examination
> and test.
>
> Here is a snippet of the crash backtrace from an instrumented kernel,
> scratched one line for sensitive reason -
>
> crash> bt
> PID: 3250 TASK: ffff9cb50fe23d80 CPU: 18 COMMAND: "cat"
> #0 [ffffc0bacf377998] machine_kexec at ffffffff9b06c7c1
> #1 [ffffc0bacf3779f8] __crash_kexec at ffffffff9b13bb52
> #2 [ffffc0bacf377ac8] crash_kexec at ffffffff9b13cdac
> #3 [ffffc0bacf377ae8] oops_end at ffffffff9b03357a
> #4 [ffffc0bacf377b10] die at ffffffff9b033c32
> #5 [ffffc0bacf377b40] do_general_protection at ffffffff9b030c52
> #6 [ffffc0bacf377b70] general_protection at ffffffff9ba03db4
> [exception RIP: string_nocheck+19]
> RIP: ffffffff9b87cc73 RSP: ffffc0bacf377c20 RFLAGS: 00010286
> RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9da13fc17fff RCX: ffff0a00ffffff04
> RDX: 726f635f63616465 RSI: ffff9da13fc17fff RDI: ffffffffffffffff
> RBP: ffffc0bacf377c20 R8: ffff9da0bfd2f010 R9: ffff9da0bfc18000
> R10: 0000000000001000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 726f635f63616465
> R13: ffff0a00ffffff04 R14: ffffffff9c1a6a4f R15: ffffffff9c1a6a4f
> ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018
> #7 [ffffc0bacf377c28] string at ffffffff9b87ce98
> #8 [ffffc0bacf377c58] vsnprintf at ffffffff9b87efe3
> #9 [ffffc0bacf377cb8] sprintf at ffffffff9b87f506
> #10 [ffffc0bacf377d18] <------------------------------>
> #11 [ffffc0bacf377d28] dev_attr_show at ffffffff9b56d183
> #12 [ffffc0bacf377d48] sysfs_kf_seq_show at ffffffff9b3272dc
> #13 [ffffc0bacf377d68] kernfs_seq_show at ffffffff9b32576c
> #14 [ffffc0bacf377d78] seq_read at ffffffff9b2be407
> #15 [ffffc0bacf377de8] kernfs_fop_read at ffffffff9b325ffe
> #16 [ffffc0bacf377e28] __vfs_read at ffffffff9b2940ea
> #17 [ffffc0bacf377eb0] vfs_read at ffffffff9b2942ac
> #18 [ffffc0bacf377ee0] sys_read at ffffffff9b29485c
> #19 [ffffc0bacf377f28] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff9b003ca9
> #20 [ffffc0bacf377f50] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffff9ba001b1
>
> crash> dis ffffffff9b87cc73
> 0xffffffff9b87cc73 <string_nocheck+19>: movzbl (%rdx),%r8d
>
> and RDX: 726f635f63616465 was a non-canonical address.
>
> After applying this patch to the instrumented kernel, instead of panic,
> the "cat" command produced "(efault)"
>
>>
>> I wonder if this patch would prevent the crash or if the broken
>> kernel would crash later anyway.
>
> A broken kernel has a different issue to be fixed, the upstream kernel
> isn't broken, it could just offer better protect in case a bug was
> introduced in future.
>
>>
>>> That said, I realized that not all
>>> architecture implement meaningful kern_addr_valid(), so this line
>>> if ((unsigned long)ptr < PAGE_SIZE || IS_ERR_VALUE(ptr))
>>> is still need. I'll send v2.
>>
>> Please, add linux-mm@xxxxxxxxx into CC.
>
> Will do.
>
>> I wonder if kern_addr_valid()
>> is safe to use anywhere, especially during early boot. I wonder if
>> it would make sense to implement it on all architectures.
>
> On x86 architecture, kern_addr_valid() looks safe to me though, on
> several other architectures, it's defined (1).
You might want to compare this patch, which seems to have some support:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20221018074014.185687-1-wangkefeng.wang@xxxxxxxxxx/
--
~Randy
