On Tue, 28 Feb 2012, Ware, Ryan R wrote:
> On Tue, Feb 28, 2012 at 7:46 AM, Andrew Morton <akpm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>wrote:
> > On Fri, 24 Feb 2012 19:19:22 -0800 (PST)
> > Hugh Dickins <hughd@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >...
> > > + if (!new_xattr->name) {
> > > + kfree(new_xattr);
> > > + return -ENOMEM;
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + memcpy(new_xattr->name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
> > > + XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN);
> > > + memcpy(new_xattr->name + XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN,
> > > + xattr->name, len);
> > > +
> > > + spin_lock(&info->lock);
> > > + list_add(&new_xattr->list, &info->xattr_list);
> > > + spin_unlock(&info->lock);
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + return 0;
> > > +}
> >
> > So if there's a kmalloc failure partway through the array, we leave a
> > partially xattrified inode in place.
> >
> > Are we sure this is OK?
> >
>
> I'm guessing Jarkko can clean that up a bit. It wouldn't be a good idea to
> leave inaccurate data structures laying around during failure cases.
Andrew raises a good concern, but Jarkko got it just right and no
change is needed: any xattrs already allocated are properly linked
on info->xattr_list, then when security_inode_init_security() fails
(with an error other than EOPNOTSUPP) the failing inode is iput(),
which ends up in shmem_evict_inode(), which kfree()s those xattrs
(and their names) on info->xattr_list.
Hugh
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