On Thu, 30 Jun 2022 11:47:39 +0300 Mike Rapoport wrote: > On Wed, Jun 29, 2022 at 09:30:12AM -0700, Axel Rasmussen wrote: > > On Tue, Jun 28, 2022 at 9:41 PM Eric Biggers <ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > > > On Tue, Jun 28, 2022 at 03:59:26PM -0700, syzbot wrote: > > > > Hello, > > > > > > > > syzbot found the following issue on: > > > > > > > > HEAD commit: 941e3e791269 Merge tag 'for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org.. > > > > git tree: upstream > > > > console+strace: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=1670ded4080000 > > > > kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=833001d0819ddbc9 > > > > dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=9bd2b7adbd34b30b87e4 > > > > compiler: gcc (Debian 10.2.1-6) 10.2.1 20210110, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Debian) 2.35.2 > > > > syz repro: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=140f9ba8080000 > > > > C reproducer: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=15495188080000 > > > > > > > > IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit: > > > > Reported-by: syzbot+9bd2b7adbd34b30b87e4@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > > > > > > > > BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff888021f7e005 > > > > #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode > > > > #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page > > > > PGD 11401067 P4D 11401067 PUD 11402067 PMD 21f7d063 PTE 800fffffde081060 > > > > Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN > > > > CPU: 0 PID: 3761 Comm: syz-executor281 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc4-syzkaller-00014-g941e3e791269 #0 > > > > Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 > > > > RIP: 0010:memset_erms+0x9/0x10 arch/x86/lib/memset_64.S:64 > > > > Code: c1 e9 03 40 0f b6 f6 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 48 0f af c6 f3 48 ab 89 d1 f3 aa 4c 89 c8 c3 90 49 89 f9 40 88 f0 48 89 d1 <f3> aa 4c 89 c8 c3 90 49 89 fa 40 0f b6 ce 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01 > > > > RSP: 0018:ffffc9000329fa90 EFLAGS: 00010202 > > > > RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000001000 RCX: 0000000000000ffb > > > > RDX: 0000000000000ffb RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff888021f7e005 > > > > RBP: ffffea000087df80 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff888021f7e005 > > > > R10: ffffed10043efdff R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000005 > > > > R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000001000 R15: 0000000000000ffb > > > > FS: 00007fb29d8b2700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 > > > > CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 > > > > CR2: ffff888021f7e005 CR3: 0000000026e7b000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 > > > > DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 > > > > DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 > > > > Call Trace: > > > > <TASK> > > > > zero_user_segments include/linux/highmem.h:272 [inline] > > > > folio_zero_range include/linux/highmem.h:428 [inline] > > > > truncate_inode_partial_folio+0x76a/0xdf0 mm/truncate.c:237 > > > > truncate_inode_pages_range+0x83b/0x1530 mm/truncate.c:381 > > > > truncate_inode_pages mm/truncate.c:452 [inline] > > > > truncate_pagecache+0x63/0x90 mm/truncate.c:753 > > > > simple_setattr+0xed/0x110 fs/libfs.c:535 > > > > secretmem_setattr+0xae/0xf0 mm/secretmem.c:170 > > > > notify_change+0xb8c/0x12b0 fs/attr.c:424 > > > > do_truncate+0x13c/0x200 fs/open.c:65 > > > > do_sys_ftruncate+0x536/0x730 fs/open.c:193 > > > > do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] > > > > do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 > > > > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 > > > > RIP: 0033:0x7fb29d900899 > > > > Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 11 15 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 > > > > RSP: 002b:00007fb29d8b2318 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004d > > > > RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fb29d988408 RCX: 00007fb29d900899 > > > > RDX: 00007fb29d900899 RSI: 0000000000000005 RDI: 0000000000000003 > > > > RBP: 00007fb29d988400 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 > > > > R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fb29d98840c > > > > R13: 00007ffca01a23bf R14: 00007fb29d8b2400 R15: 0000000000022000 > > > > </TASK> > > > > Modules linked in: > > > > CR2: ffff888021f7e005 > > > > ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- > > > > > > I think this is a bug in memfd_secret. secretmem_setattr() can race with a page > > > being faulted in by secretmem_fault(). Specifically, a page can be faulted in > > > after secretmem_setattr() has set i_size but before it zeroes out the partial > > > page past i_size. memfd_secret pages aren't mapped in the kernel direct map, so > > > the crash occurs when the kernel tries to zero out the partial page. > > > > > > I don't know what the best solution is -- maybe a rw_semaphore protecting > > > secretmem_fault() and secretmem_setattr()? Or perhaps secretmem_setattr() > > > should avoid the call to truncate_setsize() by not using simple_setattr(), given > > > that secretmem_setattr() only supports the size going from zero to nonzero. > > > > From my perspective the rw_semaphore approach sounds reasonable. > > > > simple_setattr() and the functions it calls to do the actual work > > isn't a tiny amount of code, it would be a shame to reimplement it in > > secretmem.c. > > > > For the rwsem, I guess the idea is setattr will take it for write, and > > fault will take it for read? Since setattr is a very infrequent > > operation - a typical use case is you'd do it exactly once right after > > opening the memfd_secret - this seems like it wouldn't make fault > > significantly less performant. It's also a pretty small change I > > think, just a few lines. > > Below is my take on adding a semaphore and making ->setattr() and ->fault() > mutually exclusive. It's only lightly tested so I'd appreciate if Eric > could give it a whirl. > > With addition of semaphore to secretmem_setattr() it seems we don't need > special care for size changes, just calling simple_setattr() after taking > the semaphore should be fine. Thoughts? > > >From edfcb2f0d31c2132bda483635dd2a8dd295efb04 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> > Date: Thu, 30 Jun 2022 11:26:37 +0300 > Subject: [PATCH] secretmem: fix unhandled fault in truncate > > syzkaller reports the following issue: > > BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff888021f7e005 > PGD 11401067 P4D 11401067 PUD 11402067 PMD 21f7d063 PTE 800fffffde081060 > Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN > CPU: 0 PID: 3761 Comm: syz-executor281 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc4-syzkaller-00014-g941e3e791269 #0 > Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 > RIP: 0010:memset_erms+0x9/0x10 arch/x86/lib/memset_64.S:64 > Code: c1 e9 03 40 0f b6 f6 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 48 0f af c6 f3 48 ab 89 d1 f3 aa 4c 89 c8 c3 90 49 89 f9 40 88 f0 48 89 d1 <f3> aa 4c 89 c8 c3 90 49 89 fa 40 0f b6 ce 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01 > RSP: 0018:ffffc9000329fa90 EFLAGS: 00010202 > RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000001000 RCX: 0000000000000ffb > RDX: 0000000000000ffb RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff888021f7e005 > RBP: ffffea000087df80 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff888021f7e005 > R10: ffffed10043efdff R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000005 > R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000001000 R15: 0000000000000ffb > FS: 00007fb29d8b2700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 > CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 > CR2: ffff888021f7e005 CR3: 0000000026e7b000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 > DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 > DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 > Call Trace: > <TASK> > zero_user_segments include/linux/highmem.h:272 [inline] > folio_zero_range include/linux/highmem.h:428 [inline] > truncate_inode_partial_folio+0x76a/0xdf0 mm/truncate.c:237 > truncate_inode_pages_range+0x83b/0x1530 mm/truncate.c:381 > truncate_inode_pages mm/truncate.c:452 [inline] > truncate_pagecache+0x63/0x90 mm/truncate.c:753 > simple_setattr+0xed/0x110 fs/libfs.c:535 > secretmem_setattr+0xae/0xf0 mm/secretmem.c:170 > notify_change+0xb8c/0x12b0 fs/attr.c:424 > do_truncate+0x13c/0x200 fs/open.c:65 > do_sys_ftruncate+0x536/0x730 fs/open.c:193 > do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] > do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 > RIP: 0033:0x7fb29d900899 > Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 11 15 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 > RSP: 002b:00007fb29d8b2318 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004d > RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fb29d988408 RCX: 00007fb29d900899 > RDX: 00007fb29d900899 RSI: 0000000000000005 RDI: 0000000000000003 > RBP: 00007fb29d988400 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 > R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fb29d98840c > R13: 00007ffca01a23bf R14: 00007fb29d8b2400 R15: 0000000000022000 > </TASK> > Modules linked in: > CR2: ffff888021f7e005 > ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- > > Eric Biggers suggested that this happens when > secretmem_setattr()->simple_setattr() races with secretmem_fault() so > that a page that is faulted in by secretmem_fault() (and thus removed > from the direct map) is zeroed by inode truncation right afterwards. > > Use an rw_semaphore to make secretmem_fault() and secretmem_setattr() > mutually exclusive. Given inode_lock() in do_truncate(), another simpler option is to lock inode in the fault path if the suggested race is the root cause. Hillf
