From: Michael Roth <michael.roth@xxxxxxx> Update the documentation with SEV-SNP CPUID enforcement. Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@xxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx> --- .../virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst | 28 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+) diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst index 1c6847fff304..0c72f44cc11a 100644 --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst @@ -433,6 +433,34 @@ issued by the hypervisor to make the guest ready for execution. Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error +SEV-SNP CPUID Enforcement +========================= + +SEV-SNP guests can access a special page that contains a table of CPUID values +that have been validated by the PSP as part of the SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE firmware +command. It provides the following assurances regarding the validity of CPUID +values: + + - Its address is obtained via bootloader/firmware (via CC blob), and those + binaries will be measured as part of the SEV-SNP attestation report. + - Its initial state will be encrypted/pvalidated, so attempts to modify + it during run-time will result in garbage being written, or #VC exceptions + being generated due to changes in validation state if the hypervisor tries + to swap the backing page. + - Attempts to bypass PSP checks by the hypervisor by using a normal page, or + a non-CPUID encrypted page will change the measurement provided by the + SEV-SNP attestation report. + - The CPUID page contents are *not* measured, but attempts to modify the + expected contents of a CPUID page as part of guest initialization will be + gated by the PSP CPUID enforcement policy checks performed on the page + during SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE, and noticeable later if the guest owner + implements their own checks of the CPUID values. + +It is important to note that this last assurance is only useful if the kernel +has taken care to make use of the SEV-SNP CPUID throughout all stages of boot. +Otherwise, guest owner attestation provides no assurance that the kernel wasn't +fed incorrect values at some point during boot. + References ========== -- 2.25.1
