On 11/19/21 15:22, Marco Elver wrote: > Because mm/slab_common.c is not instrumented with software KASAN modes, > it is not possible to detect use-after-free of the kmem_cache passed > into kmem_cache_destroy(). In particular, because of the s->refcount-- > and subsequent early return if non-zero, KASAN would never be able to > see the double-free via kmem_cache_free(kmem_cache, s). To be able to > detect a double-kmem_cache_destroy(), check accessibility of the > kmem_cache, and in case of failure return early. > > While KASAN_HW_TAGS is able to detect such bugs, by checking > accessibility and returning early we fail more gracefully and also > avoid corrupting reused objects (where tags mismatch). > > A recent case of a double-kmem_cache_destroy() was detected by KFENCE: > https://lkml.kernel.org/r/0000000000003f654905c168b09d@xxxxxxxxxx > , which was not detectable by software KASAN modes. > > Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@xxxxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@xxxxxxx> > --- > mm/slab_common.c | 2 +- > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c > index e5d080a93009..4bef4b6a2c76 100644 > --- a/mm/slab_common.c > +++ b/mm/slab_common.c > @@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ void kmem_cache_destroy(struct kmem_cache *s) > { > int err; > > - if (unlikely(!s)) > + if (unlikely(!s || !kasan_check_byte(s))) > return; > > cpus_read_lock(); >
