On Fri, Oct 08, 2021 at 01:04:30PM -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> +static int vmgexit_psc(struct snp_psc_desc *desc)
> +{
> + int cur_entry, end_entry, ret;
> + struct snp_psc_desc *data;
> + struct ghcb_state state;
> + struct ghcb *ghcb;
> + struct psc_hdr *hdr;
> + unsigned long flags;
int cur_entry, end_entry, ret;
struct snp_psc_desc *data;
struct ghcb_state state;
struct psc_hdr *hdr;
unsigned long flags;
struct ghcb *ghcb;
that's properly sorted.
> +
> + local_irq_save(flags);
What is that protecting against? Comment about it?
Aha, __sev_get_ghcb() needs to run with IRQs disabled because it is
using the per-CPU GHCB.
> +
> + ghcb = __sev_get_ghcb(&state);
> + if (unlikely(!ghcb))
> + panic("SEV-SNP: Failed to get GHCB\n");
> +
> + /* Copy the input desc into GHCB shared buffer */
> + data = (struct snp_psc_desc *)ghcb->shared_buffer;
> + memcpy(ghcb->shared_buffer, desc, sizeof(*desc));
That shared buffer has a size - check it vs the size of the desc thing.
> +
> + hdr = &data->hdr;
Why do you need this and why can't you use data->hdr simply?
/me continues reading and realizes why
Oh no, this is tricky. The HV call will modify what @data points to and
thus @hdr will point to new contents. Only then your backwards processing
check below makes sense.
So then you *absoulutely* want to use data->hdr everywhere and then also
write why in the comment above the check that data gets updated by the
HV call.
> + cur_entry = hdr->cur_entry;
> + end_entry = hdr->end_entry;
> +
> + /*
> + * As per the GHCB specification, the hypervisor can resume the guest
> + * before processing all the entries. Checks whether all the entries
Check
> + * are processed. If not, then keep retrying.
> + *
> + * The stragtegy here is to wait for the hypervisor to change the page
> + * state in the RMP table before guest access the memory pages. If the
accesses
> + * page state was not successful, then later memory access will result
"If the page state *change* was not ..."
> + * in the crash.
"in a crash."
> + */
> + while (hdr->cur_entry <= hdr->end_entry) {
> + ghcb_set_sw_scratch(ghcb, (u64)__pa(data));
> +
> + ret = sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(ghcb, NULL, SVM_VMGEXIT_PSC, 0, 0);
This should be
ret = sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(ghcb, true, NULL, SVM_VMGEXIT_PSC, 0, 0);
as we changed it in the meantime to accomodate HyperV isolation VMs.
> +
> + /*
> + * Page State Change VMGEXIT can pass error code through
> + * exit_info_2.
> + */
> + if (WARN(ret || ghcb->save.sw_exit_info_2,
> + "SEV-SNP: PSC failed ret=%d exit_info_2=%llx\n",
> + ret, ghcb->save.sw_exit_info_2)) {
> + ret = 1;
That ret = 1 goes unused with that "return 0" at the end. It should be
"return ret" at the end.. Ditto for the others. Audit all your exit
paths in this function.
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + /*
> + * Sanity check that entry processing is not going backward.
> + * This will happen only if hypervisor is tricking us.
> + */
> + if (WARN(hdr->end_entry > end_entry || cur_entry > hdr->cur_entry,
> +"SEV-SNP: PSC processing going backward, end_entry %d (got %d) cur_entry %d (got %d)\n",
> + end_entry, hdr->end_entry, cur_entry, hdr->cur_entry)) {
> + ret = 1;
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + /* Verify that reserved bit is not set */
> + if (WARN(hdr->reserved, "Reserved bit is set in the PSC header\n")) {
Shouldn't that thing happen first after the HV call?
> + ret = 1;
> + goto out;
> + }
> + }
> +
> +out:
> + __sev_put_ghcb(&state);
> + local_irq_restore(flags);
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static void __set_page_state(struct snp_psc_desc *data, unsigned long vaddr,
> + unsigned long vaddr_end, int op)
> +{
> + struct psc_hdr *hdr;
> + struct psc_entry *e;
> + unsigned long pfn;
> + int i;
> +
> + hdr = &data->hdr;
> + e = data->entries;
> +
> + memset(data, 0, sizeof(*data));
> + i = 0;
> +
> + while (vaddr < vaddr_end) {
> + if (is_vmalloc_addr((void *)vaddr))
> + pfn = vmalloc_to_pfn((void *)vaddr);
> + else
> + pfn = __pa(vaddr) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
> +
> + e->gfn = pfn;
> + e->operation = op;
> + hdr->end_entry = i;
> +
> + /*
> + * The GHCB specification provides the flexibility to
> + * use either 4K or 2MB page size in the RMP table.
> + * The current SNP support does not keep track of the
> + * page size used in the RMP table. To avoid the
> + * overlap request,
"avoid overlap request"?
No clue what that means. In general, that comment is talking about
something in the future and is more confusing than explaining stuff.
> use the 4K page size in the RMP
> + * table.
> + */
> + e->pagesize = RMP_PG_SIZE_4K;
> +
> + vaddr = vaddr + PAGE_SIZE;
> + e++;
> + i++;
> + }
> +
> + if (vmgexit_psc(data))
> + sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_PSC);
> +}
> +
> +static void set_page_state(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned int npages, int op)
Yeah, so this should be named
set_pages_state - notice the plural "pages"
because it works on multiple pages, @npages exactly.
> +{
> + unsigned long vaddr_end, next_vaddr;
> + struct snp_psc_desc *desc;
> +
> + vaddr = vaddr & PAGE_MASK;
> + vaddr_end = vaddr + (npages << PAGE_SHIFT);
Take those two...
> +
> + desc = kmalloc(sizeof(*desc), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
> + if (!desc)
> + panic("SEV-SNP: failed to allocate memory for PSC descriptor\n");
... and put them here.
<---
> +
> + while (vaddr < vaddr_end) {
> + /*
> + * Calculate the last vaddr that can be fit in one
> + * struct snp_psc_desc.
> + */
> + next_vaddr = min_t(unsigned long, vaddr_end,
> + (VMGEXIT_PSC_MAX_ENTRY * PAGE_SIZE) + vaddr);
> +
> + __set_page_state(desc, vaddr, next_vaddr, op);
> +
> + vaddr = next_vaddr;
> + }
> +
> + kfree(desc);
> +}
> +
> +void snp_set_memory_shared(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned int npages)
> +{
> + if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_SEV_SNP))
> + return;
> +
> + pvalidate_pages(vaddr, npages, 0);
> +
> + set_page_state(vaddr, npages, SNP_PAGE_STATE_SHARED);
> +}
> +
> +void snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned int npages)
> +{
> + if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_SEV_SNP))
> + return;
> +
> + set_page_state(vaddr, npages, SNP_PAGE_STATE_PRIVATE);
> +
> + pvalidate_pages(vaddr, npages, 1);
> +}
> +
> int sev_es_setup_ap_jump_table(struct real_mode_header *rmh)
> {
> u16 startup_cs, startup_ip;
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
> index 527957586f3c..ffe51944606a 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
> @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
> #include <asm/proto.h>
> #include <asm/memtype.h>
> #include <asm/set_memory.h>
> +#include <asm/sev.h>
>
> #include "../mm_internal.h"
>
> @@ -2010,8 +2011,22 @@ static int __set_memory_enc_dec(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc)
> */
> cpa_flush(&cpa, !this_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT));
>
> + /*
> + * To maintain the security gurantees of SEV-SNP guest invalidate the memory
"guarantees"
Your spellchecker broke again.
> + * before clearing the encryption attribute.
> + */
> + if (!enc)
> + snp_set_memory_shared(addr, numpages);
> +
> ret = __change_page_attr_set_clr(&cpa, 1);
>
> + /*
> + * Now that memory is mapped encrypted in the page table, validate it
> + * so that is consistent with the above page state.
> + */
> + if (!ret && enc)
> + snp_set_memory_private(addr, numpages);
> +
> /*
> * After changing the encryption attribute, we need to flush TLBs again
> * in case any speculative TLB caching occurred (but no need to flush
> --
> 2.25.1
>
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
