Re: Runtime Memory Validation in Intel-TDX and AMD-SNP

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On Tue, Jul 20, 2021 at 03:01:13PM -0700, Andi Kleen wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 20, 2021 at 12:54:16PM -0700, Erdem Aktas wrote:
> > I did not see any #VE implementation to handle SEPT violations when a
> > page is in PENDING state. I am assuming that this needs to be
> > supported at some point (If not then we need to discuss the use cases
> > for such support).
> 
> We actually plan to disable those #VEs, to avoid any problems with
> the system call gap. Instead the plan is that the kernel will know
> in advance what memory has been accepted or not, and accept it before
> touching.

This confuses me a bit, what happens when the VMM is malicious and
re-maps an already accepted page and the TD tries to access it?

My thinking was that this causes a #VE, but what happens instead when
this #VE can be disabled?

Regards,

	Joerg




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