Re: Runtime Memory Validation in Intel-TDX and AMD-SNP

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On Mon, Jul 19, 2021 at 02:58:22PM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> I'd like to get some movement again into the discussion around how to
> implement runtime memory validation for confidential guests and wrote up
> some thoughts on it.
> Below are the results in form of a proposal I put together. Please let
> me know your thoughts on it and whether it fits everyones requirements.

I think this proposal skips (intentionally?) something that s390 already
implemented: the secure guest deliberately allowing the hypervisor to
access certain pages for a period and then re-validating them.  I hope x86
can use the same interface as s390 for this, or if not, the interface can
be modified to be usable by all architectures.  See commit f28d43636d6f
("mm/gup/writeback: add callbacks for inaccessible pages").




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