Re: [patch 11/54] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas

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Hello Hagen,

On Thu, Jul 08, 2021 at 10:13:23PM +0200, Hagen Paul Pfeifer wrote:
> * Linus Torvalds | 2021-07-08 11:38:51 [-0700]:
> 
> Hello Mike, Linus
> 
> >> This feature is off by default and should be explicitly enabled by a system
> >> administrator.
> >>
> >> When it is enabled, a user cannot exceed RLIMIT_MEMLOCK.
> 
> Just an idea/proposal:
> 
> this feature could be granted based on capabilities (new or existing one,
> hopefully not CAP_SYS_ADMIN). Capabilities would provide a very convenient,
> simple and fine granular way to use this, at least from a user perspective. Or
> do I forget something Mike? 

Our preference is to have secretmem available to everybody.

As James nicely put it [1]:

	I don't think dividing the world into people who can and can't use
	secret memory would be useful since the design is to be usable for
	anyone who might have a secret to keep; it would become like the
	kvm group permissions: something which is theoretically an access
	control but which in practise is given to everyone on the system.
 

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/73738cda43236b5ac2714e228af362b67a712f5d.camel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx/

-- 
Sincerely yours,
Mike.




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