On Tue, Mar 16, 2021 at 11:02 AM Arnd Bergmann <arnd@xxxxxxxx> wrote: > > On Tue, Mar 16, 2021 at 8:18 AM syzbot > > <syzbot+0b06ef9b44d00d600183@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > > > Hello, > > > > > > syzbot found the following issue on: > > > > > > HEAD commit: 1e28eed1 Linux 5.12-rc3 > > > git tree: upstream > > > console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=167535e6d00000 > > > kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=e0cee1f53de33ca3 > > > dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=0b06ef9b44d00d600183 > > > userspace arch: arm > > > > > > Unfortunately, I don't have any reproducer for this issue yet. > > > > > > IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit: > > > Reported-by: syzbot+0b06ef9b44d00d600183@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > > > > +arm32 maintainer > > I think this is a real stack overflow on arm32, the stack is indeed deep. > > Nice find. I see there was already a second report, so it seems to be > reproducible as well. > If you are able to trigger this reliably, you could try printing the frame > pointer while unwinding to see what is actually going on: > > --- a/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c > +++ b/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c > @@ -68,8 +68,8 @@ void dump_backtrace_entry(unsigned long where, > unsigned long from, > unsigned long end = frame + 4 + sizeof(struct pt_regs); > > #ifdef CONFIG_KALLSYMS > - printk("%s[<%08lx>] (%ps) from [<%08lx>] (%pS)\n", > - loglvl, where, (void *)where, from, (void *)from); > + printk("%s[<%08lx>] (%ps) from [<%08lx>] (%pS), frame %08lx\n", > + loglvl, where, (void *)where, from, (void *)from, frame); > #else > printk("%sFunction entered at [<%08lx>] from [<%08lx>]\n", > loglvl, where, from); > > If that doesn't help, I could have a look at the binary to see which > functions in the call chain take a lot of stack space, if any. > > Which exact compiler version do you use for building these > kernels? I can try doing a build with the same commit and config. > > This one function is one that I have seen before when looking at build > warnings with KASAN: > > > > [<8073772c>] (integrity_kernel_read) from [<8073a904>] (ima_calc_file_hash_tfm+0x178/0x228 security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c:484) > > > [<8073a78c>] (ima_calc_file_hash_tfm) from [<8073ae2c>] (ima_calc_file_shash security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c:515 [inline]) > > > [<8073a78c>] (ima_calc_file_hash_tfm) from [<8073ae2c>] (ima_calc_file_hash+0x124/0x8b8 security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c:572) > > ima_calc_file_hash_tfm() has a SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(), which by itself can > use up 512 bytes, but KASAN sometimes triples this number. However, I see > you do not actually have KASAN enabled, so there is probably more to it. The compiler is gcc version 10.2.1 20210110 (Debian 10.2.1-6) It's available in gcr.io/syzkaller/syzbot container. (syzbot should have been provided the compiler version, something broke, I've filed https://github.com/google/syzkaller/issues/2498 for this) Yes, KASAN is not enabled on arm32 for now. Re printing FP, syzbot does not use custom patches: http://bit.do/syzbot#no-custom-patches But this does not seem to be syzbot-specific. It seems that any arm32 stack overflow report will be unactionable, so I think it would be useful to include this into the mainline kernel to make overflow reports useful for everybody (and for syzbot as a side effect).
