On 09/20, Srikar Dronamraju wrote:
>
> +static struct vma_info *__find_next_vma_info(struct list_head *head,
> + loff_t offset, struct address_space *mapping,
> + struct vma_info *vi)
> +{
> + struct prio_tree_iter iter;
> + struct vm_area_struct *vma;
> + struct vma_info *tmpvi;
> + loff_t vaddr;
> + unsigned long pgoff = offset >> PAGE_SHIFT;
> + int existing_vma;
> +
> + vma_prio_tree_foreach(vma, &iter, &mapping->i_mmap, pgoff, pgoff) {
> + if (!vma || !valid_vma(vma))
> + return NULL;
!vma is not possible.
But I can't understand the !valid_vma(vma) check... We shouldn't return,
we should ignore this vma and continue, no? Otherwise, I can't see how
this can work if someone does, say, mmap(PROT_READ).
> + existing_vma = 0;
> + vaddr = vma->vm_start + offset;
> + vaddr -= vma->vm_pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT;
> + list_for_each_entry(tmpvi, head, probe_list) {
> + if (tmpvi->mm == vma->vm_mm && tmpvi->vaddr == vaddr) {
> + existing_vma = 1;
> + break;
> + }
> + }
> + if (!existing_vma &&
> + atomic_inc_not_zero(&vma->vm_mm->mm_users)) {
This looks suspicious. If atomic_inc_not_zero() can fail, iow if we can
see ->mm_users == 0, then why it is safe to touch this counter/memory?
How we can know ->mm_count != 0 ?
I _think_ this is probably correct, ->mm_users == 0 means we are racing
mmput(), ->i_mmap_mutex and the fact we found this vma guarantees that
mmput() can't pass unlink_file_vma() and thus mmdrop() is not possible.
May be needs a comment...
> +static struct vma_info *find_next_vma_info(struct list_head *head,
> + loff_t offset, struct address_space *mapping)
> +{
> + struct vma_info *vi, *retvi;
> + vi = kzalloc(sizeof(struct vma_info), GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!vi)
> + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
> +
> + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&vi->probe_list);
Looks unneeded.
> + mutex_lock(&mapping->i_mmap_mutex);
> + retvi = __find_next_vma_info(head, offset, mapping, vi);
> + mutex_unlock(&mapping->i_mmap_mutex);
It is not clear why we can't race with mmap() after find_next_vma_info()
returns NULL. I guess this is solved by the next patches.
> +static int __register_uprobe(struct inode *inode, loff_t offset,
> + struct uprobe *uprobe)
> +{
> + struct list_head try_list;
> + struct vm_area_struct *vma;
> + struct address_space *mapping;
> + struct vma_info *vi, *tmpvi;
> + struct mm_struct *mm;
> + int ret = 0;
> +
> + mapping = inode->i_mapping;
> + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&try_list);
> + while ((vi = find_next_vma_info(&try_list, offset,
> + mapping)) != NULL) {
> + if (IS_ERR(vi)) {
> + ret = -ENOMEM;
> + break;
> + }
> + mm = vi->mm;
> + down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
> + vma = find_vma(mm, (unsigned long) vi->vaddr);
But we can't trust find_vma? The original vma found by find_next_vma_info()
could go away, at least we should verify vi->vaddr >= vm_start.
And worse, I do not understand how we can trust ->vaddr. Can't we race with
sys_mremap() ?
> +static void __unregister_uprobe(struct inode *inode, loff_t offset,
> + struct uprobe *uprobe)
> +{
> + struct list_head try_list;
> + struct address_space *mapping;
> + struct vma_info *vi, *tmpvi;
> + struct vm_area_struct *vma;
> + struct mm_struct *mm;
> +
> + mapping = inode->i_mapping;
> + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&try_list);
> + while ((vi = find_next_vma_info(&try_list, offset,
> + mapping)) != NULL) {
> + if (IS_ERR(vi))
> + break;
> + mm = vi->mm;
> + down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
> + vma = find_vma(mm, (unsigned long) vi->vaddr);
Same problems...
> + if (!vma || !valid_vma(vma)) {
> + list_del(&vi->probe_list);
> + kfree(vi);
> + up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
> + mmput(mm);
> + continue;
> + }
Not sure about !valid_vma() (and note that __find_next_vma_info does() this
check too).
Suppose that register_uprobe() succeeds. After that unregister_ should work
even if user-space does mprotect() which can make valid_vma() == F, right?
> +int register_uprobe(struct inode *inode, loff_t offset,
> + struct uprobe_consumer *consumer)
> +{
> + struct uprobe *uprobe;
> + int ret = 0;
> +
> + inode = igrab(inode);
> + if (!inode || !consumer || consumer->next)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + if (offset > inode->i_size)
> + return -EINVAL;
I guess this needs i_size_read().
And every "return" in register/unregister leaks something.
> +
> + mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
> + uprobe = alloc_uprobe(inode, offset);
Looks like, alloc_uprobe() doesn't need ->i_mutex.
OTOH,
> +void unregister_uprobe(struct inode *inode, loff_t offset,
> + struct uprobe_consumer *consumer)
> +{
> + struct uprobe *uprobe;
> +
> + inode = igrab(inode);
> + if (!inode || !consumer)
> + return;
> +
> + if (offset > inode->i_size)
> + return;
> +
> + uprobe = find_uprobe(inode, offset);
> + if (!uprobe)
> + return;
> +
> + if (!del_consumer(uprobe, consumer)) {
> + put_uprobe(uprobe);
> + return;
> + }
> +
> + mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
> + if (!uprobe->consumers)
> + __unregister_uprobe(inode, offset, uprobe);
It seemes that del_consumer() should be done under ->i_mutex. If it
removes the last consumer, we can race with register_uprobe() which
takes ->i_mutex before us and does another __register_uprobe(), no?
Oleg.
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