Re: [PATCH v3] mm/vmalloc: randomize vmalloc() allocations

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On Mon, 15 Feb 2021 22:26:34 +0200 Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:

> Memory mappings inside kernel allocated with vmalloc() are in
> predictable order and packed tightly toward the low addresses, except
> for per-cpu areas which start from top of the vmalloc area. With
> new kernel boot parameter 'randomize_vmalloc=1', the entire area is
> used randomly to make the allocations less predictable and harder to
> guess for attackers. Also module and BPF code locations get randomized
> (within their dedicated and rather small area though) and if
> CONFIG_VMAP_STACK is enabled, also kernel thread stack locations.
> 
> On 32 bit systems this may cause problems due to increased VM
> fragmentation if the address space gets crowded.
> 
> On all systems, it will reduce performance and increase memory and
> cache usage due to less efficient use of page tables and inability to
> merge adjacent VMAs with compatible attributes. On x86_64 with 5 level
> page tables, in the worst case, additional page table entries of up to
> 4 pages are created for each mapping, so with small mappings there's
> considerable penalty.
>
> ...
>

How useful is this expected to be?  What sort of attack scenarios will
this help to defend against?

And what do others think of the proposal?




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