From: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@xxxxxxxxxx> Subject: kasan: clarify HW_TAGS impact on TBI Mention in the documentation that enabling CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS always results in in-kernel TBI (Top Byte Ignore) being enabled. Also do a few minor documentation cleanups. Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Iba2a6697e3c6304cb53f89ec61dedc77fa29e3ae Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/3b4ea6875bb14d312092ad14ac55cb456c83c08e.1610733117.git.andreyknvl@xxxxxxxxxx Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@xxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@xxxxxxx> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@xxxxxxx> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@xxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@xxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@xxxxxxx> Cc: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@xxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@xxxxxxx> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@xxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> --- Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst | 16 +++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) --- a/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst~kasan-clarify-hw_tags-impact-on-tbi +++ a/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst @@ -147,15 +147,14 @@ negative values to distinguish between d like redzones or freed memory (see mm/kasan/kasan.h). In the report above the arrows point to the shadow byte 03, which means that -the accessed address is partially accessible. - -For tag-based KASAN this last report section shows the memory tags around the -accessed address (see `Implementation details`_ section). +the accessed address is partially accessible. For tag-based KASAN modes this +last report section shows the memory tags around the accessed address +(see the `Implementation details`_ section). Boot parameters ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -Hardware tag-based KASAN mode (see the section about different mode below) is +Hardware tag-based KASAN mode (see the section about various modes below) is intended for use in production as a security mitigation. Therefore it supports boot parameters that allow to disable KASAN competely or otherwise control particular KASAN features. @@ -289,6 +288,13 @@ reserved to tag freed memory regions. Hardware tag-based KASAN currently only supports tagging of kmem_cache_alloc/kmalloc and page_alloc memory. +If the hardware doesn't support MTE (pre ARMv8.5), hardware tag-based KASAN +won't be enabled. In this case all boot parameters are ignored. + +Note, that enabling CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS always results in in-kernel TBI being +enabled. Even when kasan.mode=off is provided, or when the hardware doesn't +support MTE (but supports TBI). + What memory accesses are sanitised by KASAN? -------------------------------------------- _
