Re: [NEEDS-REVIEW] [PATCH v18 05/25] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states

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On 1/29/2021 1:00 PM, Dave Hansen wrote:
On 1/27/21 1:25 PM, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
@@ -135,6 +135,8 @@ enum xfeature {
  #define XFEATURE_MASK_PT		(1 << XFEATURE_PT_UNIMPLEMENTED_SO_FAR)
  #define XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU		(1 << XFEATURE_PKRU)
  #define XFEATURE_MASK_PASID		(1 << XFEATURE_PASID)
+#define XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER		(1 << XFEATURE_CET_USER)
+#define XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL	(1 << XFEATURE_CET_KERNEL)
  #define XFEATURE_MASK_LBR		(1 << XFEATURE_LBR)
#define XFEATURE_MASK_FPSSE (XFEATURE_MASK_FP | XFEATURE_MASK_SSE)
@@ -237,6 +239,23 @@ struct pkru_state {
  	u32				pad;
  } __packed;
+/*
+ * State component 11 is Control-flow Enforcement user states
+ */
+struct cet_user_state {
+	u64 user_cet;			/* user control-flow settings */
+	u64 user_ssp;			/* user shadow stack pointer */
+};

Andy Cooper just mentioned on IRC about this nugget in the spec:

	XRSTORS on CET state will do reserved bit and canonicality
	checks on the state in similar manner as done by the WRMSR to
	these state elements.

We're using copy_kernel_to_xregs_err(), so the #GP *should* be OK.
Could we prove this out in practice, please?


Do we want to verify that setting reserved bits in CET XSAVES states triggers GP? Then, yes, I just verified it again. Thanks for reminding. Do we have any particular case relating to this?

--
Yu-cheng




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