On Wed, Nov 11, 2020 at 4:09 PM Alexander Potapenko <glider@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > On Tue, Nov 10, 2020 at 11:11 PM Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > This is a preparatory commit for the upcoming addition of a new hardware > > tag-based (MTE-based) KASAN mode. > > > > kasan_non_canonical_hook() is only applicable to KASAN modes that use > > shadow memory, and won't be needed for hardware tag-based KASAN. > > > > No functional changes for software modes. > > > > Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@xxxxxxxxxx> > > Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@xxxxxxx> > > Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@xxxxxxxxxx> > > --- > > Change-Id: Icc9f5ef100a2e86f3a4214a0c3131a68266181b2 > > --- > > mm/kasan/report.c | 3 ++- > > 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > > > diff --git a/mm/kasan/report.c b/mm/kasan/report.c > > index 5d5733831ad7..594bad2a3a5e 100644 > > --- a/mm/kasan/report.c > > +++ b/mm/kasan/report.c > > @@ -403,7 +403,8 @@ bool kasan_report(unsigned long addr, size_t size, bool is_write, > > return ret; > > } > > > > -#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE > > +#if (defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS)) && \ > > + defined(CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE) > > /* > > * With CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE, accesses to bogus pointers (outside the high > > * canonical half of the address space) cause out-of-bounds shadow memory reads > > Perhaps this comment also needs to be updated. In what way?
