There are three possible options to create a shadow stack allocation API: an arch_prctl, a new syscall, or adding PROT_SHSTK to mmap()/mprotect(). Each has its advantages and compromises. An arch_prctl() is the least intrusive. However, the existing x86 arch_prctl() takes only two parameters. Multiple parameters must be passed in a memory buffer. There is a proposal to pass more parameters in registers [1], but no active discussion on that. A new syscall minimizes compatibility issues and offers an extensible frame work to other architectures, but this will likely result in some overlap of mmap()/mprotect(). The introduction of PROT_SHSTK to mmap()/mprotect() takes advantage of existing APIs. The x86-specific PROT_SHSTK is translated to VM_SHSTK and a shadow stack mapping is created without reinventing the wheel. There are potential pitfalls though. The most obvious one would be using this as a bypass to shadow stack protection. However, the attacker would have to get to the syscall first. Since arch_calc_vm_prot_bits() is modified, I have moved arch_vm_get_page _prot() and arch_calc_vm_prot_bits() to x86/include/asm/mman.h. This will be more consistent with other architectures. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200828121624.108243-1-hjl.tools@xxxxxxxxx/ Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx> --- v13: - Add VM_SHSTK to VM_ARCH_CLEAR. arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h | 81 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h | 28 ++--------- include/linux/mm.h | 1 + include/linux/mman.h | 8 ++++ mm/mmap.c | 8 +++- mm/mprotect.c | 4 ++ 6 files changed, 105 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..5cd6040d5c10 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef _ASM_X86_MMAN_H +#define _ASM_X86_MMAN_H + +#include <asm/cpufeature.h> +#include <linux/mm.h> +#include <uapi/asm/mman.h> + +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS +/* + * Take the 4 protection key bits out of the vma->vm_flags + * value and turn them in to the bits that we can put in + * to a pte. + * + * Only override these if Protection Keys are available + * (which is only on 64-bit). + */ +#define arch_vm_get_page_prot(vm_flags) __pgprot( \ + ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT0 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT0 : 0) | \ + ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT1 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT1 : 0) | \ + ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT2 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT2 : 0) | \ + ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT3 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT3 : 0)) + +#define pkey_vm_prot_bits(prot, key) ( \ + ((key) & 0x1 ? VM_PKEY_BIT0 : 0) | \ + ((key) & 0x2 ? VM_PKEY_BIT1 : 0) | \ + ((key) & 0x4 ? VM_PKEY_BIT2 : 0) | \ + ((key) & 0x8 ? VM_PKEY_BIT3 : 0)) +#else +#define pkey_vm_prot_bits(prot, key) (0) +#endif + +static inline unsigned long arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(unsigned long prot, + unsigned long pkey) +{ + unsigned long vm_prot_bits = pkey_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey); + + if (!(prot & PROT_WRITE) && (prot & PROT_SHSTK)) + vm_prot_bits |= VM_SHSTK; + + return vm_prot_bits; +} +#define arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey) arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey) + +static inline bool arch_validate_prot(unsigned long prot, unsigned long addr) +{ + unsigned long supported = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC | PROT_SEM; + + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK_USER) && + static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) && (prot & PROT_SHSTK)) { + + supported |= PROT_SHSTK; + + /* + * A shadow stack mapping is indirectly writable by only + * the CALL and WRUSS instructions, but not other write + * instructions). PROT_SHSTK and PROT_WRITE are mutually + * exclusive. + */ + supported &= ~PROT_WRITE; + } + + return (prot & ~supported) == 0; +} +#define arch_validate_prot arch_validate_prot + +static inline bool arch_vma_can_mprot(struct vm_area_struct *vma, + unsigned long prot) +{ + bool can_mprot; + + /* + * Function call stack should not be backed by a file or shared. + */ + can_mprot = !(prot & PROT_SHSTK) || + !(vma->vm_file || (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED)); + return can_mprot; +} +#define arch_vma_can_mprot arch_vma_can_mprot + +#endif /* _ASM_X86_MMAN_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h index d4a8d0424bfb..39bb7db344a6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h @@ -1,31 +1,11 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note */ -#ifndef _ASM_X86_MMAN_H -#define _ASM_X86_MMAN_H +#ifndef _UAPI_ASM_X86_MMAN_H +#define _UAPI_ASM_X86_MMAN_H #define MAP_32BIT 0x40 /* only give out 32bit addresses */ -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS -/* - * Take the 4 protection key bits out of the vma->vm_flags - * value and turn them in to the bits that we can put in - * to a pte. - * - * Only override these if Protection Keys are available - * (which is only on 64-bit). - */ -#define arch_vm_get_page_prot(vm_flags) __pgprot( \ - ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT0 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT0 : 0) | \ - ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT1 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT1 : 0) | \ - ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT2 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT2 : 0) | \ - ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT3 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT3 : 0)) - -#define arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, key) ( \ - ((key) & 0x1 ? VM_PKEY_BIT0 : 0) | \ - ((key) & 0x2 ? VM_PKEY_BIT1 : 0) | \ - ((key) & 0x4 ? VM_PKEY_BIT2 : 0) | \ - ((key) & 0x8 ? VM_PKEY_BIT3 : 0)) -#endif +#define PROT_SHSTK 0x10 /* shadow stack pages */ #include <asm-generic/mman.h> -#endif /* _ASM_X86_MMAN_H */ +#endif /* _UAPI_ASM_X86_MMAN_H */ diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h index 9b6a0f22cd89..da4f7d3a14b7 100644 --- a/include/linux/mm.h +++ b/include/linux/mm.h @@ -334,6 +334,7 @@ extern unsigned int kobjsize(const void *objp); #if defined(CONFIG_X86) # define VM_PAT VM_ARCH_1 /* PAT reserves whole VMA at once (x86) */ +# define VM_ARCH_CLEAR VM_SHSTK #elif defined(CONFIG_PPC) # define VM_SAO VM_ARCH_1 /* Strong Access Ordering (powerpc) */ #elif defined(CONFIG_PARISC) diff --git a/include/linux/mman.h b/include/linux/mman.h index 6f34c33075f9..4d776adb0fdf 100644 --- a/include/linux/mman.h +++ b/include/linux/mman.h @@ -103,6 +103,14 @@ static inline bool arch_validate_prot(unsigned long prot, unsigned long addr) #define arch_validate_prot arch_validate_prot #endif +#ifndef arch_vma_can_mprot +/* + * Allow architectures to check if the vma can support the new + * protection. + */ +#define arch_vma_can_mprot(vma, prot) true +#endif + /* * Optimisation macro. It is equivalent to: * (x & bit1) ? bit2 : 0 diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c index 81d4a00092da..4c403dfccff0 100644 --- a/mm/mmap.c +++ b/mm/mmap.c @@ -1445,6 +1445,12 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr, struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); unsigned long flags_mask; + /* + * Call stack cannot be backed by a file. + */ + if (vm_flags & VM_SHSTK) + return -EINVAL; + if (!file_mmap_ok(file, inode, pgoff, len)) return -EOVERFLOW; @@ -1509,7 +1515,7 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr, } else { switch (flags & MAP_TYPE) { case MAP_SHARED: - if (vm_flags & (VM_GROWSDOWN|VM_GROWSUP)) + if (vm_flags & (VM_GROWSDOWN|VM_GROWSUP|VM_SHSTK)) return -EINVAL; /* * Ignore pgoff. diff --git a/mm/mprotect.c b/mm/mprotect.c index a8edbcb3af99..cf73b59a36da 100644 --- a/mm/mprotect.c +++ b/mm/mprotect.c @@ -553,6 +553,10 @@ static int do_mprotect_pkey(unsigned long start, size_t len, error = -ENOMEM; if (!vma) goto out; + if (!arch_vma_can_mprot(vma, prot)) { + error = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } prev = vma->vm_prev; if (unlikely(grows & PROT_GROWSDOWN)) { if (vma->vm_start >= end) -- 2.21.0
