Other mm routines such as kfree() and kzfree() silently do the right
thing if passed a NULL pointer, so ksize() should do the same.
Signed-off-by: William Kucharski <william.kucharski@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
mm/slab_common.c | 14 +++++---------
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c
index 9e72ba224175..2bff01ad94d8 100644
--- a/mm/slab_common.c
+++ b/mm/slab_common.c
@@ -1660,10 +1660,9 @@ static __always_inline void *__do_krealloc(const void *p, size_t new_size,
gfp_t flags)
{
void *ret;
- size_t ks = 0;
+ size_t ks;
- if (p)
- ks = ksize(p);
+ ks = ksize(p);
if (ks >= new_size) {
p = kasan_krealloc((void *)p, new_size, flags);
@@ -1723,10 +1722,9 @@ void kzfree(const void *p)
size_t ks;
void *mem = (void *)p;
- if (unlikely(ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(mem)))
- return;
ks = ksize(mem);
- memset(mem, 0, ks);
+ if (ks)
+ memset(mem, 0, ks);
kfree(mem);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(kzfree);
@@ -1749,8 +1747,6 @@ size_t ksize(const void *objp)
{
size_t size;
- if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!objp))
- return 0;
/*
* We need to check that the pointed to object is valid, and only then
* unpoison the shadow memory below. We use __kasan_check_read(), to
@@ -1764,7 +1760,7 @@ size_t ksize(const void *objp)
* We want to perform the check before __ksize(), to avoid potentially
* crashing in __ksize() due to accessing invalid metadata.
*/
- if (unlikely(objp == ZERO_SIZE_PTR) || !__kasan_check_read(objp, 1))
+ if (unlikely(ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(objp)) || !__kasan_check_read(objp, 1))
return 0;
size = __ksize(objp);
--
2.26.2
