On Thu, Feb 13, 2020 at 12:40 AM Minchan Kim <minchan@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> To solve the issue, this patch introduces a new syscall process_madvise(2).
> It uses pidfd of an external process to give the hint.
[...]
> + mm = mm_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS);
> + if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(mm)) {
> + ret = IS_ERR(mm) ? PTR_ERR(mm) : -ESRCH;
> + goto release_task;
> + }
> +
> + ret = do_madvise(task, start, len_in, behavior);
When you're accessing another task, you should ensure that the other
task doesn't gain new privileges by executing a setuid binary in the
middle of being accessed. mm_access() does that for you; it holds the
->cred_guard_mutex while it is looking up the task's ->mm and doing
the security check. mm_access() then returns you an mm pointer that
you're allowed to access without worrying about such things; an
mm_struct never gains privileges, since a setuid execution creates a
fresh mm_struct. However, the task may still execute setuid binaries
and such things.
This means that after you've looked up the mm with mm_access(), you
have to actually *use* that pointer. You're not allowed to simply read
task->mm yourself.
Therefore, I think you should:
- change patch 1/8 ("mm: pass task to do_madvise") to also pass an
mm_struct* to do_madvise (but keep the task_struct* for patch 4/8)
- in this patch, pass the mm_struct* from mm_access() into do_madvise()
- drop patch 3/8 ("mm: validate mm in do_madvise"); it just papers
over a symptom without addressing the underlying problem
