Re: [PATCH v10 1/2] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options

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On Thu, Jul 4, 2019 at 9:53 PM Andrew Morton <akpm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> On Wed, 3 Jul 2019 13:40:26 +0200 Alexander Potapenko <glider@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> > > There are unchangelogged alterations between v9 and v10.  The
> > > replacement of IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING)) with
> > > page_poisoning_enabled().
> > In the case I send another version of the patch, do I need to
> > retroactively add them to the changelog?
>
> I don't think the world could stand another version ;)
>
> Please simply explain this change for the reviewers?

As Qian Cai mentioned in the comments to v9:

> Yes, only checking CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING is not enough, and need to check
> page_poisoning_enabled().

Actually, page_poisoning_enabled() is enough, because it checks for
CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING itself.
Therefore I've just replaced IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING)) with
page_poisoning_enabled().

-- 
Alexander Potapenko
Software Engineer

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