Re: [PATCH, RFC 44/62] x86/mm: Set KeyIDs in encrypted VMAs for MKTME

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On 6/14/19 11:46 AM, Alison Schofield wrote:
> On Fri, Jun 14, 2019 at 11:26:10AM -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
>> On 6/14/19 10:33 AM, Alison Schofield wrote:
>>> Preserving the data across encryption key changes has not
>>> been a requirement. I'm not clear if it was ever considered
>>> and rejected. I believe that copying in order to preserve
>>> the data was never considered.
>>
>> We could preserve the data pretty easily.  It's just annoying, though.
>> Right now, our only KeyID conversions happen in the page allocator.  If
>> we were to convert in-place, we'd need something along the lines of:
>>
>> 	1. Allocate a scratch page
>> 	2. Unmap target page, or at least make it entirely read-only
>> 	3. Copy plaintext into scratch page
>> 	4. Do cache KeyID conversion of page being converted:
>> 	   Flush caches, change page_ext metadata
>> 	5. Copy plaintext back into target page from scratch area
>> 	6. Re-establish PTEs with new KeyID
> 
> Seems like the 'Copy plaintext' steps might disappoint the user, as
> much as the 'we don't preserve your data' design. Would users be happy
> w the plain text steps ?

Well, it got to be plaintext because they wrote it to memory in
plaintext in the first place, so it's kinda hard to disappoint them. :)

IMNHO, the *vast* majority of cases, folks will allocate memory and then
put a secret in it.  They aren't going to *get* a secret in some
mysterious fashion and then later decide they want to protect it.  In
other words, the inability to convert it is pretty academic and not
worth the complexity.




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