Re: [PATCH] mm: Prevent mapping slab pages to userspace

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On 25/01/2019 19.38, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
It's never appropriate to map a page allocated by SLAB into userspace.
A buggy device driver might try this, or an attacker might be able to
find a way to make it happen.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>

Acked-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@xxxxxxxxxx>

A WARN_ON_ONCE() would be nice here to let those buggy drivers know that they will no longer work.

---
  mm/memory.c | 2 +-
  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/mm/memory.c b/mm/memory.c
index e11ca9dd823f..ce8c90b752be 100644
--- a/mm/memory.c
+++ b/mm/memory.c
@@ -1451,7 +1451,7 @@ static int insert_page(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr,
  	spinlock_t *ptl;
retval = -EINVAL;
-	if (PageAnon(page))
+	if (PageAnon(page) || PageSlab(page))
  		goto out;
  	retval = -ENOMEM;
  	flush_dcache_page(page);





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