On Fri, 2018-12-07 at 15:45 -0800, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> The brutal fact is that a physical address is an astronomical stretch
> from a random value or increasing counter. Thus, it is fair to say that
> MKTME provides only naive measures against replay attacks...
I'll try to summarize how I understand the high level security
model of MKTME because (would be good idea to document it).
Assumptions:
1. The hypervisor has not been infiltrated.
2. The hypervisor does not leak secrets.
When (1) and (2) hold [1], we harden VMs in two different ways:
A. VMs cannot leak data to each other or can they with L1TF when HT
is enabled?
B. Protects against cold boot attacks.
Isn't this what this about in the nutshell roughly?
[1] XPFO could potentially be an opt-in feature that reduces the
damage when either of these assumptions has been broken.
/Jarkko
