Re: [PATCH] mm/usercopy: Use memory range to be accessed for wraparound check

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

 



On 2018-11-14 03:46, William Kucharski wrote:
On Nov 14, 2018, at 4:09 AM, David Laight <David.Laight@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

From: William Kucharski
Sent: 14 November 2018 10:35

On Nov 13, 2018, at 5:51 PM, Isaac J. Manjarres <isaacm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

diff --git a/mm/usercopy.c b/mm/usercopy.c
index 852eb4e..0293645 100644
--- a/mm/usercopy.c
+++ b/mm/usercopy.c
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ static inline void check_bogus_address(const unsigned long ptr, unsigned long n,
				       bool to_user)
{
	/* Reject if object wraps past end of memory. */
-	if (ptr + n < ptr)
+	if (ptr + (n - 1) < ptr)
		usercopy_abort("wrapped address", NULL, to_user, 0, ptr + n);

I'm being paranoid, but is it possible this routine could ever be passed "n" set to zero?

If so, it will erroneously abort indicating a wrapped address as (n - 1) wraps to ULONG_MAX.

Easily fixed via:

	if ((n != 0) && (ptr + (n - 1) < ptr))

Ugg... you don't want a double test.

I'd guess that a length of zero is likely, but a usercopy that includes the highest address is going to be invalid because it is a kernel address
(on most archs, and probably illegal on others).
What you really want to do is add 'ptr + len' and check the carry flag.

The extra test is only a few extra instructions, but I understand the
concern. (Though I don't
know how you'd access the carry flag from C in a machine-independent
way. Also, for the
calculation to be correct you still need to check 'ptr + (len - 1)'
for the wrap.)

You could also theoretically call gcc's __builtin_uadd_overflow() if
you want to get carried away.

As I mentioned, I was just being paranoid, but the passed zero length
issue stood out to me.

    William Kucharski

Hi William,

Thank you and David for your feedback. The check_bogus_address() routine is only invoked from one place in the kernel, which is __check_object_size(). Before invoking check_bogus_address, __check_object_size ensures that n is non-zero, so it is not possible to call this routine with n being 0. Therefore, we shouldn't run into the scenario you described. Also, in the case where we are copying a page's contents into a kernel space buffer and will not have that buffer interacting with userspace at all, this change to that check should still be valid, correct?

Thanks,
Isaac Manjarres




[Index of Archives]     [Linux ARM Kernel]     [Linux ARM]     [Linux Omap]     [Fedora ARM]     [IETF Annouce]     [Bugtraq]     [Linux OMAP]     [Linux MIPS]     [eCos]     [Asterisk Internet PBX]     [Linux API]

  Powered by Linux