On 18-11-13 21:17:42, Timofey Titovets wrote: > вт, 13 нояб. 2018 г. в 20:59, Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@xxxxxxxxxx>: > > > > On 18-11-13 15:23:50, Oleksandr Natalenko wrote: > > > Hi. > > > > > > > Yep. However, so far, it requires an application to explicitly opt in > > > > to this behavior, so it's not all that bad. Your patch would remove > > > > the requirement for application opt-in, which, in my opinion, makes > > > > this way worse and reduces the number of applications for which this > > > > is acceptable. > > > > > > The default is to maintain the old behaviour, so unless the explicit > > > decision is made by the administrator, no extra risk is imposed. > > > > The new interface would be more tolerable if it honored MADV_UNMERGEABLE: > > > > KSM default on: merge everything except when MADV_UNMERGEABLE is > > excplicitly set. > > > > KSM default off: merge only when MADV_MERGEABLE is set. > > > > The proposed change won't honor MADV_UNMERGEABLE, meaning that > > application programmers won't have a way to prevent sensitive data to be > > every merged. So, I think, we should keep allow an explicit opt-out > > option for applications. > > > > We just did not have VM/Madvise flag for that currently. > Same as THP. > Because all logic written with assumption, what we have exactly 2 states. > Allow/Disallow (More like not allow). > > And if we try to add, that must be something like: > MADV_FORBID_* to disallow something completely. No need to add new user flag MADV_FORBID, we should keep MADV_MERGEABLE and MADV_UNMERGEABLE, but make them work so when MADV_UNMERGEABLE is set, memory is indeed becomes always unmergeable regardless of ksm mode of operation. To do the above in ksm_madvise(), a new state should be added, for example instead of: case MADV_UNMERGEABLE: *vm_flags &= ~VM_MERGEABLE; A new flag should be used: *vm_flags |= VM_UNMERGEABLE; I think, without honoring MADV_UNMERGEABLE correctly, this patch won't be accepted. Pasha
